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Southern Academic Review

A Student Journal of Scholarship

No. 4
Spring 1990



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Printed by Ebsco, Birmingham, Alabama

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Contents

ARTICLES

Divine Violence in William Blake's "The Tyger" <i>Mona Garrett</i>	1
From Strindberg to Allen: A Discussion of the Pivotal Films of Ingmar Bergman and Their Various Influences <i>Russell C. Rice</i>	7
The Violence of Closure: Views by Levinas and Derrida <i>Suzanne Cloyd</i>	17
The Challenge of Evolution: Marxist Historicism and the Relativist Stand <i>Brant Phillips</i>	26

Senator Margaret Chase Smith's "Declaration of Conscience:" An Early Response to McCarthyism <i>Merle W. Underwood</i>	44
Gorbachev's Perestroika: The Failure of Reform <i>Caroline McDonald</i>	63
Ending Hunger: Obstacles and Opportunities <i>Leslie McFall</i>	77
Rabbit's Search for a Dalai Lama <i>Kate Sheehan</i>	92
The Difference an Election Makes <i>Charles H. Franklin</i> <i>Washington University</i>	100



Divine Violence in William Blake's "TheTyger"

by Mona Garrett

The poetry of William Blake has a mystical quality that makes it memorable and unique. Because Blake was a reactionary against neo-classicism, his poetry has some of the undercurrents of the Romantic movement. Yet, he does not fit into the mold of the traditional Romantic poet such as Wordsworth, Keats, or Shelley.

It can even be said that Blake fits into no mold. His beliefs and visions were complex and often paradoxical. He is considered by many to be an unrestrained rebel in his poetry as well as his political and religious beliefs. He opposed war and the government in general; his political ideas were revolutionary in nature. Blake's spiritual convictions were different from Christianity; to him, religion was more than God--it was a deep belief in imaginative energy and genius.

Blake's ideas about growth and human experience are expressed in his collection Songs of Innocence and of Experience. The gentle poems of childhood in Songs of Innocence are contrasted with their somewhat bitter companion poems in Songs of Experience. Two of the most famous poems from this collection are "The Lamb" and its companion poem "The Tyger."

William Blake's poem "The Tyger" is a poem filled with energy; descriptive words and actions convey a sense of force and imaginative tension. In this poem Blake shows a fascination with this creative energy, the violence and purity which mesh together through imagination. Blake describes a divine violence in the creation of the tiger. It is a fearsome animal that is viewed positively because it is a product of God's imaginative energy.

The first description of the tiger states that it is "burning bright" (line 1). There is a sense of illumination, especially since the tiger is burning in the "forests of the night" (line 2). J. Bronowski best describes the tiger as a "symbol of energy burning in a darkening world" (158). Fire, like the tiger and God, has the power to destroy; yet, burning is also positively associated with purification.

There is a visual contrast of brightness and darkness in the first two lines. According to The Herder Symbol Dictionary, light often represents "inspiration and spiritual vision," and darkness represents "spiritual dullness;" thus, the tiger as a beacon is a positive figure ("Light"). Because the tiger, living in the dark forest, "can orient itself even in darkness. . . [it] represents the inner light" ("Tiger").

After giving this description of the tiger, the speaker asks, "What immortal hand or eye/ Could frame thy fearful symmetry" (lines 3-4). There is a sense of the awful power of God in these lines because the hand of God represents strength and the power to shape. As one Blake scholar, Hazard Adams, states, "the physical creation of brute force is represented by the hand of God thrust down from above into our world" (55-6). The image of an eye connotes perception and visualization, and in Christian art "an eye in the hand of God signifies God's creative wisdom" ("Eye"). If the images of "hand" and "eye" are brought together there is a sense of invention--the eye visualizes a form and the hand creates it. In this way, the tiger is a

"creation of the imaginative eye of God and a symbol of that imaginative power" (Adams 57).

In line four, "fearful symmetry" presents the tiger as a beast of violent perfection. God is divine; He creates a divine symmetry in the tiger. The tiger is dangerous, but this fact is balanced with the fact that it is a creation of God. This balance, according to another Blake scholar Martin K. Nurmi, makes "a positive statement affirming the dread tiger's divinity" (35).

This divinity is reaffirmed in lines five and six, for the speaker suggests a similarity between the tiger and God. In the first stanza the tiger is burning in the forests; in the second stanza, God the creator, or "fire of thine eyes" (line 6), burns in "distant deeps or skies" (line 5). The tiger and God both seem to burn with energy. The phrases "dare he aspire" and "dare seize the fire" (lines 7-8) suggest that only a fierce God would venture to imagine or create such a wild beast. There is a sense that the Creator and the tiger are fueled by the same emotion. E.D. Hirsch, Jr. states that "the divine artist plays with ferocity out of ferocity. . . the fire of those eyes is the spark of divinity" (70-1). If the tiger is dreadful, then the creator must also have a dreadful aspect.

Moreover, stanzas three and four describe the creation of the tiger in dreadful terms. The verbs "seize" (line 8), "twist" (line 10), and "clasp" (line 16) are violent motions showing the force behind this formation. There is a superhuman sense of strength conveyed by the image of a "shoulder" (line 9) twisting "the sinews of thy heart" (line 10). The speaker's rhetorical questions, coupled with the images of supreme power, imply that the speaker does not consider any being lesser than God capable of creating the awesome energy of the tiger. The speaker seems to ask who but God could have the strength and daring to put such force into physical form.

This physical imagery continues in the fourth stanza where the main image is one of a blacksmith--a blacksmith who,

according to Adams, "is not only the strongest of creatures but also the greatest of artists" (58). This stanza pounds with the rhythm of the tiger's heartbeat and the blacksmith's hammer-- "What the hammer? what the chain?" (line 13; emphasis added). There is an intensity in the image of the heartbeat being created with the hammer "as an act of fiery craftsmanship in a fantastic smithy" (Hirsch 71). The words "furnace" (line 14) and "anvil" (line 15) bring to mind the blacksmith's forge; this, Hirsch states, is "a place where incandescent energy and artistic control meet, just as they meet in the fearful symmetry of the tiger" (71). God's power is united with the restraint needed to create the complexity of an animal form. This is shown again in lines fifteen and sixteen: "What dread grasp/ Dare its deadly terrors clasp?" These lines show God fiercely seizing and controlling the energy required to form the tiger.

The fifth stanza is the climax of the poem, where God takes pleasure in the work He has accomplished. Lines seventeen and eighteen allude to the fall of Lucifer and his angels: the rebellious angels, or "stars" (line 17), "threw down their spears" (line 17) when they were defeated by God. When they were thrown into Hell they "water'd heaven with their tears" (line 18); these tears turned into stars (Hirsch 72). The vanquishing of the rebellious angels is followed by Earth's creation; thus, the God who threw out Lucifer is, according to Hirsch, "a terrible and inscrutable God, but however terrible his work is, it is sanctified by vitality, order, and beauty" (72). Likewise, the God who creates the vicious tiger can also create the gentle lamb.

God's "smile" comes after "his work" (line 19) is done-- the defeat of Lucifer and the creation of the earth and the tiger. It is interpreted by Hirsch as "the smile of the artist who has forged the richest and most vital of possible worlds, a world that contains both the tiger and the lamb" (72). If God made two such different things, the lamb and the tiger, then His smile can

be seen as His pleasure at their union. Because they are united in this poem, Hirsch says that the tiger is "a double perspective that acknowledges. . . Mercy, Pity, and Love, and . . . cruelty, energy, and destructiveness" (68). God displayed His violence when He threw Lucifer into Hell, and this violence is a part of the tiger and humanity. Jesse Bier, another Blake scholar, states that it is the "powerful, tormenting evil that frustrates man and. . . constitutes one half of each individual human soul" (22). The tiger represents "the marvelous and fatal together, within each of us" (Bier 24). Thus, violence and peace are united in God and in humanity, and it is a state which Blake sees as positive and natural. Bier sees Blake as a man who is "for activism as opposed to passivity, prophetic vision as against static reason" (23).

Although the last stanza of the poem seems a mere repetition of the first stanza, line twenty-four of the poem replaces the "could frame" of line four with "dare frame." The change of auxiliary verbs implies that only God could and would dare to form a violent but beautiful creature such as the tiger. God's ferocity and gentleness exist together; He has the power to create the tiger and the lamb. They form a whole that is expressed in line twenty: "Did he who made the Lamb make thee?" The answer is yes, for the tiger is, according to Hirsch, "a creation that is. . .like God Himself beyond good or evil" (72).

The violence that humanity calls evil is a powerful imaginative energy when it is unified with good. The God that Blake describes possesses this energy. Blake's God is a complete whole because He holds a balance of force and delicacy. Blake expresses this wholeness through the creation of the tiger; he shows that God can form grace and beauty and combine it with destructive power. Blake seems to accept this God because he can appreciate God's mercy and still marvel at God's imaginative energy.

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From Strindberg to Allen:
A Discussion of the Pivotal Films of
Ingmar Bergman and their Various Influences

Russell C. Rice

As well as being an extremely interpretive film maker, Ingmar Bergman can be regarded as one of the most influential directors in cinematic history. However, investigating the various influences on Bergman himself can yield a greater understanding of his own work. Bergman's deep interest in and affection for the works of great play writers such as August Strindberg accounts for the significant roles that the theater plays in many of his films. An interesting multifaceted cross influence exists between Bergman and Federico Fellini which is most notable in Fellini's quintessential work 8 1/2. Cinematic heirs apparent such as Woody Allen benefit greatly from the examples set by Bergman and Fellini.

Many of Bergman's films reveal his great passion for the theater. In Fanny and Alexander a family troupe of play actors comprise a microcosm which is an escape from a society which Gustav refers to as being full of "unintelligible people." For the young child Alexander and his entire family, the dramatic projection of the imagination in the theater serves as the only point of clarity in life. A similar representation of the theater can be found in Through a Glass, Darkly when young Minus

and Karin perform a play for their father, David. As well as being a *frametales* for the action of the entire movie, this simplistic play also represents one of the few displays of true feeling in the film. In a family situation in which words disguise rather than reveal inner thoughts, Minus finds a method of conveying his own through drama. Film critic Birgitta Steene concurs and adds that this is "one of the few scenes in the film where words and emotional message fuse" (99). That this successful communication takes the form of a play asserts Bergman's belief in the extensive power of the theater to relate feelings and ideas.

Although Bergman was quite familiar with Kierkegaard, Chekhov, and Ibsen, the playwright whose ideas had the most profound impact on him was August Strindberg. Having directed and produced many of his works including The Ghost Sonata and A Dream Play, Bergman admits to a sincere love for Strindberg and his works in his autobiography (201). In the preface of A Dream Play, Strindberg expresses his intent to relate in the play how the "imagination spins and weaves new patterns made up of memories, experiences, unfettered fancies, absurdities, and improvisations" (Steene 72). This blurring of reality and vision fascinates Bergman and pervades throughout his work in films. A culminating cinematic homage to this concept, and more specifically to A Dream Play, is the extraordinary Wild Strawberries. To reduce Wild Strawberries to a mere imitation of Strindberg's work would nonetheless be a travesty of perception. In this work, Bergman's awareness of the stage's limitations becomes apparent as he capitalizes on the ability of the camera to more effectively blend dreams and reality. One tool which Bergman utilizes to advance this Strindbergian notion is the flashback. These "clear...recollections of the mind" flow so smoothly from his reality as to enable Bergman to convincingly demonstrate the lucidity of the living past. When Marianne recalls her conversation with Evald in the

car, the present is so easily exchanged for the past that the audience may share her memory without making an awkwardly large mental leap. Slightly overexposed film is another device Bergman uses to carry through the dream effect. The resulting images assume a glaring quality and capture a sufficiently surrealistic atmosphere into which the audience is immediately drawn. Equally effective dreamlike elements are difficult to obtain on the stage. However, it is precisely Bergman's theatricality that allows him to get away with these techniques. Such technical devices allow Wild Strawberries to stand on its own as what Mosley maintains is "a more schematic, neater, tougher, less self-indulgently whimsical work than Strindberg's" (29). Bergman's inspired and somewhat more palpable journey to self-revelation nevertheless marks the beginnings of his exploration of the artistic potential of the camera.

Many elements in Bergman's highly influential Wild Strawberries prefigure those that are present in Federico Fellini's 8 1/2. Though Fellini avoids the movie theaters for fear of being influenced by other directors, he does include Wild Strawberries among his favorite Bergman films (Murray 32-33). Like Bergman, Fellini smooths the transitions of dream sequences until they glide freely into and out of his reality. His method of returning from a dream directly to the next scene in the present rather than back to the scene in which the dream begins results in a less cumbersome work and allows him to maintain a particular stream of consciousness comparable to that in Wild Strawberries. Another instance of this occurs in 8 1/2 when Fellini's distressed director and main character, Guido Anselmi, dreams that he commits suicide at a press conference. Fellini withdraws the audience from the nightmare when he abruptly switches to Guido instructing the workers to destroy the set which he had constructed for his next film. Some thematic resemblances also exist between the two films. Both films depict a man's journey to self-awareness through visions

and memories. One of Guido's final self-examinations takes the form of a screen test and is extremely reminiscent of Isak Borg's classroom sequence. Each character experiences humiliating personal realizations before a group of onlookers to whom they are in some way related. These parallels emphasize the influence of Wild Strawberries on Fellini as both film makers apply their artistic vision to similar themes.

In many of their films, Bergman and Fellini concern themselves with the permanent mental implantation of symbolic images during childhood. In 8 1/2, a young Guido is introduced to crude sexuality by means of Saraghina, a large ugly woman who dances to entertain him and his friends. In an interview, Fellini affirms that this prostitute represents "sex seen by a child. Hence she is grotesque, but also seductive to one so innocent" (Murray 144). Bergman also relates the sexual experience through the eyes of a child in The Silence with different results. Young Johan sees his mother and a stranger kiss and retire to a bedroom and is mildly shocked. However, his extremely intimate relationship with his mother has already acquainted him with the sensual world, therefore removing from the situation the grotesque element present in Guido's experience. Thus, all that remains for Johan to determine is the reason and intent behind his mother's infidelity. Bergman very effectively attaches an element of precociousness to the boy that is absent in Fellini's interpretation. Both are nonetheless effective approaches to this idea whose impact relies heavily upon the child's viewpoint.

Symbolic similarities also exist between the works of Fellini and Bergman. The following quotation is attributed to Bergman and deals with the nature of some of his early symbolism: "Whenever I am in doubt and uncertainty I take refuge in the vision of a simple and pure love. I find this love in those spontaneous women who . . . are the incarnation of purity (Mosley 28)."

This passage could easily apply to Guido and his version of the ideal woman in 8 1/2. From his frustration at his inability to control or even communicate with the women in his life, Guido fashions in his visions an image of the perfect woman. Like Mia in Bergman's The Seventh Seal and Sara in Wild Strawberries, Claudia is consistently cloaked in white and injects hope and promise into an otherwise bleak situation. The "pure love" that Bergman evokes through Mia and Jof exemplifies that which Guido desires but can not have. However, at one point in the film a disgruntled Guido exclaims: "Enough of symbolism, and these escapist themes of purity and innocence." Later, as Guido begins to accept himself and those around him for what they are, the real Claudia arrives dressed in black and catalyzes his return to reality by replacing his overly idealistic female image. Bergman was greatly affected by 8 1/2 and could empathize with Guido's struggle. Frank Gado, author of the greatly comprehensive Passion of Ingmar Bergman, even ventures to suggest that the film so fascinated Bergman that he "fell under its influence" (310). Bergman also tires of heavily loaded symbolism, and his film Persona reveals evidence of a new outlook. Like Fellini's Guido, Bergman's intention is to transcend his typical symbolism, and the resulting work focuses on more personal and psychological themes. By essentially dismissing old symbols such as the spider and the crucifix in the opening sequence, Bergman is able to more liberally travel into the interiors of the mind. The metamorphosis of Bergman's symbolism from his early films to films such as Persona parallels and is interrelated with that of Fellini's as described in 8 1/2.

Another contemporary film maker who has gone through an artistic transition is Woody Allen. A great admirer of Bergman's, Allen admits to what he calls "a lifelong addiction" (29) to his films. Many verbal displays of this deep respect for Bergman can be found in Allen's films. In Manhattan, for

instance, Allen's character Ike defends Bergman against a pseudo-intellectual's argument that his works are bleak and pessimistic to the point of immaturity. An aggravated Ike responds and claims that "Bergman's the only genius in cinema today." What fascinates Allen is Bergman's unique visualization of the human mind. In his review of Bergman's autobiography, Allen points out how Bergman "evoked a style to deal with the human interior, and he alone among directors has explored the soul's battlefield to the fullest" (30).

Traces of homage to Bergman can be found even in Allen's early slapstick comedies. In Love and Death, Allen touches humorously on many concepts that Bergman tangled with and that would later be prevalent in much more serious pictures of his own. In one send-up of Bergmanesque technique, Allen's character Boris pontificates about wheat as a deep philosophical notion to his cousin as both are filmed in penetrating close-ups worthy of Bergman's The Silence. Evident also in this film is Allen's inheritance of Bergman's struggle with the fear of death. As in Bergman's The Seventh Seal a Death figure taunts the hero throughout the film, although Allen's version is clad in white and is only asked such questions about the afterlife as: "Are there girls?" The finale of Love and Death showing Boris dancing away with death along a beautiful lake, is much like the ending of The Seventh Seal. As one critic states, "the film suggests that artists like . . . Bergman are to be valued despite Allen's affectionate ridicule because, in the end, they are the only sources of beauty and coherence we have" (World Film Directors 24). Beneath the mocking in these early Allen comedies one can detect his desire to capture for himself the essence of the soul's struggle. These dramatically inauspicious beginnings lead to films such as Another Woman, Allen's own insightful adaptation of Bergman's Wild Strawberries, and the recent Crimes and Misdemeanors, Allen's version of a morality play in a desensitized society that he considers to be devoid of

morals.

With Stardust Memories, his own personal 8 1/2, Allen relates the difficulty of his transition as a cinematic artist. Unlike Fellini's character Guido, Allen struggles not only for emotional honesty in his films but also to overcome the laughable stereotype set by his early films. Relying on Fellini's masterpiece for structure, Allen adopts many of Bergman's techniques as he describes his artistic dilemma. Sandy Bates, the troubled director in Allen's film, experiences many flashbacks and dreams as he attends a festival honoring his films. This self-evaluating journey and the irony involved with the honors given to Sandy recall Isak Borg's similar mental and physical voyage. One flashback focuses on Sandy's only true love, Dorrie, who also serves as his ideal representation of purity and innocence. Allen's multiple close-up shots and manipulation of shadows on her black and white image recall Bergman's exploration of the emotionally revealing capabilities of the human face in Persona. Dorrie is ultimately committed to an insane asylum, and glimmers of the joy and hope in their relationship remain only in Sandy's memory. Allen's symbol therefore represents clouded innocence and is only one among many indications in the film of his darkening outlook on life. In the words of critic Diane Jacobs, "Stardust Memories seriously questions what the comic does when he begins to perceive life as tragedy" (27). It serves as a fascinating declaration of Allen's intent to allow his somewhat Scandinavian, Bergman-influenced creative urges to override his concerns about the skeptical critics and the unsuspecting public.

Much of Allen's creative success can be attributed to his mastery of the tragi-comic sentiment that can be found in many of Bergman's films. In The Seventh Seal, one particularly powerful scene is the one which depicts Skat's death. The Death figure finds Skat at the top of a tree and claims him by sawing the tree down. The tragedy of this death is offset by the

humor of a squirrel leaping onto the stump directly afterwards. Here is Bergman's suggestion about the tragic and the comic in life. They walk together and are invariably linked. This notion prevails in Allen's acclaimed Hannah and Her Sisters, a film consisting of many Bergmanesque elements and even casting troupe member Max von Sydow as a somewhat worn out and gloomy artist. Allen's character Mickey Sachs can be closely identified with Henrik in Bergman's Smiles of a Summer Night. Through Henrik, Bergman magnifies the heartfelt struggle to find and maintain a balance between virtue and temptation in life. Bergman transforms the height of this struggle into farce as Henrik's attempted suicide brings the solution to his problems in the form of a sleeping woman. Mickey in Allen's picture endeavors constantly to find meaning in life and some sort of proof of God's existence. After a failed attempt at suicide, Mickey proceeds to find peace with himself and a reason to live while watching a Marx Brothers movie. The hilarious process that leads to Mickey's discovery offsets the rather grim ideological nature of the quest itself. In this manner, Allen's entertaining wit and humor combine with his concern for philosophical ideas to expand and elaborate on Bergman's working definition of tragi-comedy.

Such ideas as human suffering, self-examination, self-denial, love, religion, and death have made up the thematic core of great literature for centuries. The ultimate task of artists is therefore to adapt and evoke such themes with a certain degree of honesty through their own creative vision and talent. Ingmar Bergman exercises his keen eye with a camera in order to expand and explore through motion pictures the psychologically poignant and interpretive notions of great playwrights such as Strindberg. In this aspect, Bergman is arguably the most ingenious technical if not literary innovator in the brief history of film to date. Relying on these groundbreaking techniques, Federico Fellini handles similar themes with a somewhat more

epicurean and characteristically Italian perspective. Woody Allen's neurotic, self-effacing sense of humor and cunning wit add a stimulating, unmistakably American element to the classic formula. The foundation upon which these and other truly great directors build was more than partly established by Ingmar Bergman, a fundamental figure in the development of the cinema as a literary art form.

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The Violence of Closure: Views by Levinas and Derrida

Suzanne Cloyd

What is held within the gaze of the other? What is the encounter with the other? Coming face-to-face with the other is for Emmanuel Levinas gazing wide-eyed into infinity. The expression of infinity is encountered in the experience of the face. Within speech and vision, the face is within this world but not a part of this world because it opens up and transcends the totality present within this world. Thus Levinas claims that the basis for the ethical is found in the experience with the other individual (Levinas 61-64). When faced with the presence of another person, one may choose to be open to the infinite possibilities within the experience, or one may choose to reject all possibilities and thus shut out the fullness of the experience. Jacques Derrida connects with Levinas in the sense that both Derrida's concept of language and Levinas's phenomenology of the other address coexistence with otherness. Derrida draws from Levinas's radical claim that meaning within existence is possible only through opening oneself to infinity. Both Levinas and Derrida yearn to deconstruct closure or totality. As Derrida states:

It is at this level that Emmanuel Levinas can make us tremble. At the heart of the desert, in the growing wasteland, this thought, which fundamentally is longer seeks to be a thought of Being and phenomenality, makes us dream of an inconceivable process of dismantling and dis-possession (82).

Levinas's principle philosophical work is his book Totality and Infinity. In this text, he views totality in the human condition as closure or absolutization of events and of existence. Consequently, totality is the absolutizing of the self. In doing this, the individual must try to force others into his or her world. This totalization expresses itself primarily through egocentrism, and Levinas views two particular forms in which this takes place. First of all, one may see the other as simply an extension of oneself. In other words, no division is perceived between oneself and the other. Therefore one assumes the other to be like oneself and may believe the other to be somewhat of an alter ego. If one then learns that the other is indeed different from oneself then one rejects the other individual out of fear and misunderstanding. Secondly, one can view the other as something to be manipulated to one's advantage or ordered according to one's existence. Levinas contends that human beings have been conditioned to see the other as an object to be placed. This yearning to control or dominate has its roots in technology and power structures of society. In any case, both viewing the other as an extension of self and viewing the other as something to be manipulated are forms of totalization. To truly experience "the other," Levinas holds that one must perceive the other in a radically different manner (45-52).

Infinity is this radically different perception. Levinas defines infinity as the openness to the future or a basic openness

to the possibilities held within existence. In this manner, Levinas holds that we must view the other as a completely separate entity with no preconceived idea that the other is like us or that we may dominate over it. This openness to the other is the only way we can have what he deems to be "an original experience" of the other person, but this original experience has been stifled by history and the systems we have created to order our lives. Thus in order to free ourselves as responsible individuals, we must have the desire to know the other as the other. We must accept the other individual for what she is and not impose upon her our own world view. In pursuing this desire on our own, we become infinitizers rather than totalizers (57-59).

Levinas places great emphasis on his concept of "the face." In this he says that as we first meet the other in all of his or her strangeness face to face, we encounter her vulnerability. However, she is still an alien distant from us in her own world. At the moment of the encounter we can choose to totalize or infinitize our encounter with the other. It is the face of the other that implores us to respond to the other. We must respond to the other person as the experience presents itself, not forcing it into our expectation or standard. At this point, Levinas sets forth that the only way we can be released from our self-centeredness is to make ourselves open or vulnerable to the other, and this alone will free our experience from totalization. Yet as we interact with the other, we must leave his or her otherness intact. Language is the mode within which we can relate to the other. We must respond to another person's presence in speech and in a sense offer ourselves to them. In dialogue then we relate to that person as we exist apart from our words. Levinas holds that because we do not own our words, we remain autonomous even in conversation with other people (127-32). True communication takes place with the other individual when the experience is left open. In this, the encoun-

ter is not forced into some other standard but is left to define itself. According to Levinasian thought, this is the only responsible communication to another individual -- to leave their individuality or otherness free from interpretation. One acts irresponsibly when he or she totalizes the encounter through attempting to limit the other person or the experience. A responsible interaction with another must entail an openness to infinity. Therefore, for Levinas the experience of the other, or the very encounter with the other, calls us to a certain ethical sensibility (136-39). This concept of ethical sensibility, indeed the category of the ethical, is a higher expression of metaphysics for Levinas. Ethics is deemed as that which precedes all philosophical thought; thus, all philosophical questions have their origin in ethics. It is only in this very encounter with the other person that one grasps ethical specificity. In responding with openness or ethical sensibility to the other, one is actually responding the whole of humanity. In other words, the encounter with the other is of grave importance to all people because an ethical response can contribute to the infinity of existence while an unethical response can contribute to the totality of existence. Therefore, freedom or closure of existence is bound within our response to the other. This ethical response is a recourse which exceeds beyond philosophy and cannot be questioned or challenged (Derrida 83). Levinas states, "We thus encounter in our own way the Platonic idea of the Good beyond Being" (293). Ethical existence is thus not motivated toward the good but rather toward humanity via "the other." There is no way to conceptualize this encounter because it is resistant to all categories (41). Therefore the infinitely-other cannot be bound by concepts.

To come face to face with the other, to exchange glances, and then to speak -- this is to interrupt all totalities. The encounter is not limited because as Levinas holds, we are distanced from both sight and language. The exchange between

two individuals must always remain open and spontaneous according to him, because it is only through spontaneity that autonomy remains intact. Levinas depicts the other to be one who reveals himself or herself through the face; not one who must be interpreted. The face of another person reveals the soul of that person and nothing more or less than this. In infinitizing our experience with the other, we search for who or what she is in her radical existence. One's being will not be jeopardized in this encounter. Levinas invites us to view the encounter with the other as the experience which far exceeds any other experience. Indeed, this moment may be considered religious. The ethical relationship encompasses all that religion represents (Derrida 97). This is illustrated in Levinas's statement that "the other resembles God" (77). Perhaps then the other individual represents both humanity and God, and thus the encounter with the other must be an ethical experience. Because of this, the experience cannot be closed or totalized but must be open and embrace infinity (Derrida 101).

Just as Levinas resists closure in the experience of the other, Derrida resists closure in the experience of language. To Derrida, language is a construct which cannot be mastered. What is signified exists apart from its sign, and according to him, we are in essence missing the point of language when we attempt to totalize or capture language. Any act of naming, such as grammatical construction, is necessarily trying to bring order to disorder, and Derrida views this act as violent. An example of this violent closure is seen in the language of philosophical discourse, the birth of which Derrida attributes to Plato. This discourse is particularly violent because Derrida holds that Plato, in the very attempt to define metaphysics, has limited metaphysics (105). Philosophy as a search for metaphysics has been destructive in and of itself because it has been an attempt to establish Being over Becoming. In attempting to say what metaphysics is, we have closed off the possibilities of

what it may be. The following quotation illustrates this concept: "That Philosophy died one day, within history, or that it has always fed on its own agony, on the violent way it opens history by opposing itself to nonphilosophy . . ." (Derrida 79). Derrida argues that we cannot encompass or bracket Existence within a language. In attempting to do so we have privileged language and that has impeded, if not completely ended, the unfolding of existence. To even enter into dialogue about Philosophy is to limit Philosophy. Derrida holds that we must find a new way, a new mode of explaining, expressing, or articulating our world views. Rational construction has been the preferred framework for metaphysics and for construction of the mind. Derrida contends that "rational knowledge must not be the Word of words" (132). Metaphysics, he claims, is the attempt within history to contain within time and space Being over Becoming. He states, "The result is nothing without its becoming" (84). Because of this, Derrida argues that only by using metaphorical language can we resist this totalization that imposes on rationalistic thought. The Greeks idolized language by putting it into a rational system which denies language's foundation upon metaphor. The signified cannot express itself but can be understood only through metaphor. According to Derrida, in self-consciously recognizing language as metaphorical, we can move beyond our limited and constrained understandings of language which have dominated philosophical thought and discourse (Derrida 107). Therefore, the dialogue which was produced within the Greek tradition is a "fundamental, conceptual system" which dominates all manners of philosophy (Derrida 85). It is believed that philosophy must adhere to this rational system lest it destroy itself as a philosophical language. However, according to Derrida, this system which seems to be a security prescribed by the Greek element is not really a security at all, but rather the framework for distortion and limitation. By this he is referring

to the absolutization of the quest for the metaphysical. For Derrida, the Greek aim to establish philosophy as a science must be reevaluated and restructured. The realization that metaphor has been the grounding for language must come about. Derrida contends that there must be an awareness within communities that symbols and signs can never fully correspond with or represent the signified. Once that is established, communities can strive for the knowledge and security which language can bring through the transcendence of this world (80-87).

It is at this point that Derrida believes Levinas to be an ontological reformist, in that he presents us with the alternative approach to existence which has its roots in ungrounded ethical response to the other. It is only through this response that we can move beyond the structure system which has terrorized the history of language and, consequently, philosophical thought. It is in this thought presented by Levinas that the "entirety of the Greek Logos has been erupted" (82). Derrida holds that in this thought, "which calls upon the ethical relationship -- a nonviolent relationship to the infinite as infinitely other, to the Other," metaphysics is released to become, without the limitations of rational thought and language systems (86). It is in the encounter with the face of the other, as revealed by Levinas, that ethics and metaphysics support themselves from within. This, according to Derrida, sets the foundation for the transcendence of closure within language as well as human existence.

The philosophical approaches of both Levinas and Derrida are resistant to the paradigm of being as set forth in philosophical thought. Being for Levinas and Derrida is equalled with closure or absolutization, because it is complete and leaves no room for expansion or the thought of the infinite. Infinity is related to Becoming because it leaves the possibilities for change and movement intact. The "other-regarding" way of thought rejects the traditional assumption that reason is not plural. Instead of totalizing existence, Levinas contends that

reason has many centers and that we must approach what is infinite in a multiplicity of forms. Therefore, as we encounter the other, we must respond through the use of language while knowing that language can never truly capture reality (Levinas 183-86).

Nonetheless, language must be used as a vulnerable response to the other. For Levinas, the gaze is an expression of transcendent reality which must accompany language for there to be an adequate response to another human being. Although he holds that both gaze and speech are necessary to non-totalization, both are distanced from the individual. For Derrida the glance is itself a "language" which much like the search for metaphysics is inarticulatable. For Levinas and Derrida, our modes of existence convey our response to closure. To establish closure, whether in language or in an encounter with the other, is violence while to resist closure is meaning. As we try to make the other into what we are, we are reducing the other to what it is not. It is thus only in the moment that we experience the other (whether the other is language or a human being) and accept the other without force, and without attempting to destroy, master, or convert it does meaning exist. Totalizers and infinitizers give very different responses to the question of meaningful existence. There is an element of self-destruction present within totalization which denies the experience of existence, such that the search for infinity is largely unknown and untried due to the bondage of rational construction and totalizing power systems (Derrida 137-45). How then will one respond to the totality which presents itself and the infinity which is available?

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The Challenge of Evolution: Marxist Historicism and the Relativist Stand

Brant Phillips

Over the course of the last two hundred years, the development of humanity and its society has been the product of technological and industrial revolutions that have forever changed the perceptions of humankind, our society and its organization. Moreover though, it must be understood that this so-called advancement has more closely been a by-product of competing schools of thought which have set the stage for the entrance of industrialization, technical growth and their accompanying prosperity. These, of course, are the notions of capitalism and its critical respondent, communism, as espoused by Adam Smith and Karl Marx respectively. For it is under the ideologies and formulations, or derivatives thereof, of these two schools around which all of organized civilization centers itself. While capitalism is simply explained, in brief, by the classical laissez-faire economics of Smith, Marxism is definitely more intricate as a set of principles because it uses as its basis the need for change incumbent upon inequalities instituted under capitalism. The primary tenet has come to be then somewhat historical in its imperative, hence historical materialism and the reason of and for Marx. As with development, the pace of history has

markedly accelerated. It therefore becomes necessary to examine history as it is made ever more rapidly and to understand its validity as a foundation of the organization of our world. As an ultimate concept for that organization, Marxism, as presupposed through historical materialism, should be a stable, unidirectional course toward the end of history through classlessness. It should not render itself open to interpretation or fluctuation, like capitalism, in order to meet this goal. It is, then, the purpose of this work to closely examine Marx's materialist conception of history, from its origins to its critics, and to render a position on the accuracy and applicability of his thoughts as they struggle to work within the continually divergent progress we know as change.

I. ORIGINS OF THE THEORY

The theory of historical materialism is the primary basis from which all other avenues of Marxist thought extend. It is the genesis because it defines the relationships between productive forces and social entities which are what correspond to the nature of development. Marx said it most clearly in the Preface to his Critique of Political Economy when he outlined the results of his research:

The general result at which I have arrived... can be briefly stated as follows: In the social production of their life, men enter into definite relations that are indispensable and independent of their will; relations of production which correspond to a definite stage of development of their material productive forces. The sum total of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society, on which rises a legal and political superstructure and to which

correspond definite forms of social consciousness. The mode of production of material life conditions the social, political, and intellectual life process in general. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their being, but, on the contrary, their social being that determines their consciousness (Tucker 4).

It is with this, then, that we establish the materialist conception of history. It should be noted that Marx regarded this idea that he put forth as a science, not a theory or postulate. He believed that his principles were empirical in their nature, and thus testable, heightening their validity. Marx used the word "materialist" to make a contrast with what is obviously or implicitly supernatural, metaphysical, or speculative. "He believed that a general science of human society could be worked out only by describing or explaining society in empirical terms" (Acton 12).

However, this was not always the case, and the notions put forward by Marx and his friend Friedrich Engels were not entirely original in their conception. Prior to Marx becoming an historian and economist, he was an ardent student of philosophies. He was particularly enthusiastic about the schools of both Hegel and Kant, although he later came to disavow his Hegelian tendencies (See 45). Yet it became apparent in some of his earlier writing that this would-be scientific view of history arose from a metaphysical prototype. Prior to his collaboration with Engel in the 1840's, he had used philosophical and moral considerations to justify his radical concepts (Acton 12). By 1844 though, Marx had fallen away from Hegelian views and had begun an intensive study of economics under the insistence of Engels, and he began to adopt those principles to his work. Using the thought of Hegel as his quarry, Marx developed a critique of the metaphysical.

Hegel had thought that man "externalized" his ideas on the world, and that it was this process which transformed the material world and "humanized" it. Human labor, then, became the instruments through which development and change occurred. Hegel also observed that as labor divided and subdivided, some of the jobs accorded became trivial and, in some cases, even degrading (Acton 12). However, Hegel looked upon this somewhat more favorably than Marx and noted that it was this division, coupled with the differentiation of society into classes and orders, that made possible accomplishments in thought, ideas, and production that could never be realized in more homogenous cultures. "The word that Hegel had used for the process of externalizing ideas into the natural world was 'alienation'" (Acton 12). Marx began to synthesize many other influences during this time prior to 1847 and his Manifesto. Most notably were the schools of Proudhon, Sismondi, Friedrich List, and particularly that of Pecqueur for his emphasis on the importance of industrial concentration, the effects of machinery, and the proletarianization of the middle classes (See 49). He also gained a great deal from the writings of Feuerbach, whom he highly regarded. Yet, he later rebuked Feuerbach for his idealism which stands in sharp contrast to Marx's materialism (See 47). It was materialism, then, that came to rest as the basis for the investigation of development and thought, and it was here that Marx began to pull away from other philosophers, and most particularly Hegel.

As noted earlier, it was Hegel who had considered the differentiation of society to be the key to "the production of work of mind." As Hegel saw it, this development came through the contradictions of ideas. There existed an absolute idea that was the ultimate form of reality. The material realm was nothing more than the realization of that idea. If realities were birthed and then faded, it was because they were in contradiction with the absolute and were not themselves an

absolute. Thus, where contradiction is at work, there is the force of development (Cornforth 53). Marx primarily came to reflect this because it was based on idealism and did not "materially" suit the notion of dialectics.

For Marx, dialectics did not represent self-development of a concept, but rather the science of the general laws of motion in both the real world and human thought (Cornforth 53). People consider things materialistically in their minds, that is, how they are in the real world. Images are regarded as real things and not immaterial substances juxtaposed between this or that stage in their development as an absolute. If then, the natural and human thought are both substances, it is the same substance manifested in different fashions. Whether one is external or conscious is irrelevant (Cornforth 53). Both physical necessity and consciousness are real and should be considered so when interpreting the development of history. It is here, under the guise of dialectical materialism that Marx questioned Hegel's approach to alienation or "estrangement" as he sometimes called it. Marx did not find alienation to be a resultant necessity in the development of an absolute, and from this he structured his critique of capitalism. To Marx, labor became a commodity not much unlike that which it produced. This did not allow for the self-development of the worker in Hegelian sense, and locked him into unwilled destinies. Additionally, this subjected labor to impersonal market forces over which it had no control (Acton 12). The changes wrought by a worker did not serve the world or himself, but were perverted under the system of wages which forced the worker to sell himself to another person (Acton 12). This halted self-development on all fronts and would eventually expend itself. This was how Marx would solve the riddle of history - by planned but noncoercive communism that would rise from the dissolution of capitalism (Acton 13).

In its essence the materialist conception of history then is

as H. B. Acton put it in his critique The Illusion of the Epoch. Here he noted that Marxists consider the theory not as an expendable hypothesis, but rather as a truth for why history happened as it did and what is next to come of it (151). To summarize the theory in its most basic form one could turn to the work of Z. A. Jordan where he states most succinctly, "(t)his is the theory which explains social and historical development by the causal relationship between the economic base and the ideological superstructure, by the state of tension between the productive forces and the relations of productivity, by the conflict between the modes of productivity and property relations, or by the determination of ideological forms by the economic structure of society" (309). This premise supplants social evolution with the law of variation and succession which more accurately describes social/historical progression. With these there are three basic assumptions to be put forward. The first establishes that every socio-economic formation has a set of laws which, unique unto itself, determine and pace the origin, development and decay of that formaton. The second regards the transition from one socio-economic formation as a necessary development that occurs regardless of man's opinion or perception. Finally, each formation will ultimately be replaced by another of higher development. As such, social/historical development occurs progressively (Jordan, 309).

Placed into a more concrete example, the historically materialist view asserts that life depends on that which is extracted from the modes of productivity. These modes are determined by the forces of production which is the society's ability to utilize its resources once it is mobilized. These include the population, skills, laws, art, techniques, and government, to name a few (Heilbroner 65). Within these forces of productivity are the relations of productivity. Put simply these are the social arrangements which direct the forces of productivity and allocate the output for society (Heilbroner 65). As Marx saw

it, society develops so that one group, or class, comes to monopolize the forces of productivity, and hence the entire mode of productivity, at the expense of all others. The resultant inequities promote antagonism between one group and the others, the proletariat and bourgeoisie of capitalism, for example. Eventually, the proletariat would rise against the bourgeoisie and remove them to form a new series of classes. In the end, the last proletariat of the last developed socioeconomic formation would triumph and the world would fall into communist placidity under which all the former superstructures would disappear and a classless, egalitarian society would emerge. All of history then could be accurately analyzed under this formula for class struggle, and all of civilization could expect society to terminate in communist finality. It is this notion that Marx developed and which served as his base, and it is from this standpoint that all further Marxist analysis must be considered.

II. CRITIQUES OF APPLICATION

Since its publication, the notion of historical materialism has come under the critical scrutiny of many great thinkers and is still the object of much debate. With Marx's call to mobilize society and more specifically with his efforts to revolutionize the manner in which one would visualize both history and the future of time itself, he left much to abstraction and less to specifics. As such, the need for interpretation becomes necessary. Since 1848, critics have found a multitude of problems with Marx and his theory of history. We shall discuss four arguments: the validity of dialects, the notion of economic determinism, the nature of class conflict, and the assertion of historical materialism as empirical science.

As we have discussed previously, the major force powering the materialist conception is that of dialectics as salvaged from reincarnated Hegelianism. Marx and Engels determined

that dialects amounted to the general laws of motion, in this case, as applied to history. Maurice Cornforth observed that with this notion Marx showed us how to understand social change and how to move the working class toward socialism (54). Historical dialecticism became the instrumental weaponry of the proletariat and established its duty to the imperative of development that Marx had outlined. Yet several problems erupt when one examines the dialectical method more closely.

Most apparent upon this inspection is the fact that save for the rationalism used to "correct" Hegel's interpretation of the dialectic, dialectics does not provide within itself a method for its own verification and validation (Shaw 107). William Shaw goes on to conclude that "(t)he fact that neither the 'negation of negation' nor any similar dialectical leyerdomain is intended within historical materialism to verify the inevitability of socialism also implies that neither dialectical nor philosophical props to the proletariat's claim to be capitalism's gravedigger furnish its real scientific, historical justification" (109). This is not to suppose that either Marx or Engels accepted or applied dialectics blindly, but merely to note that as a system of interpretation or formulation, it is automatically ambiguous.

Upon further examination one can find fault with the nature of dialectics as it relates to change. The ideology asserts that all of reality is motion without rest and thus change is its very essence. Yet if one stops to consider this, one must do just that -- stop. It is here that we find the next problem with Marxist justification. The motion of dialectics is constant, which makes it awkward to our cognitive capacities (Heilbroner 32). In order for things to be examined, we think in terms of a universe that stops its processes to allow for such an activity. Such is not the character of dialectical methodology, and this makes it apparent that we cannot easily review its tenets under the process of normal inquiry (Heilbroner 33). And it is this difference between the idiosyncrasies of dialectics and empirical thought

which make it almost impalatable to rationality. "A dialectical methodology has not found a way of reconciling its suggestive mode of forming concepts or of formulating the task of science with its continued reliance on nondialectical techniques to test the validity of its concepts or its science in use" (Heilbroner 52). This distinguishes dialects from positive, empirical reasoning because the two are not entirely compatible. One requires controlled suspended conditions while the other requires continual mutation. How could one prove the other? Quite simply, to do so would be to eliminate many and possibly most of the factors under analysis. It is therefore untenable as a testable postulate, which renders its position of dialectics as a theoretical motivator subject to speculation.

Another area of complication comes from the formulation of the theory itself, based on the vague language used by Marx. Within historical materialism Marx concludes that all change must come from the relation of the base (read economy/productivity) to the superstructure (read laws, organizations, religion, culture). Marx said that no changes could be extracted solely from the superstructure because it, in fact, was erected on top of the base. Indeed, in the final analysis of historical materialism the actualization of the base becomes complete through communism and the superstructure, or state, withers away. This analysis would lead one to believe that Marx is centering his views on some derivation of economic determinism, although Marx expressly stated he did not avow this standpoint. This would make the economy or modes of productivity the prime determinant in the development of society. Yet, this would be a fatal misconception because it would subject the unidirectional course of history to the unpredictable, uncontrollable forces of the economy, and thus subvert any predictions about the conquest of socialism. Marx himself wrote that the determining aspect of life is production. It was this need and the action of production which determined

the potential of a society technically and culturally. If this is so, then the legal, political and social, even religious aspects of a society pervade the modes of productivity (Heilbroner 65). The necessity of production dominates over all others and thus, is the prime determinant in the thought of men and women (Heilbroner 65). It is this then that gives an "economic" shadow to the materialist view of history.

Problems arise here because the direction and stability of societal development would come to rely solely on the economic base, and such a fragile thesis has been widely criticized. As changes occurred in the economic foundation, then, the entire superstructure would be subverted (Federn 116). And yet it is irrational to say that the future of the economy is solely reliant on fate to determine its course. Change in the base can come from the superstructure, as Louis Dupre noted when he said that governments, whether through their instability or policy can cause economic unrest. To ascribe change solely to the socioeconomic basis is too simplistic (93). William Shaw also concluded that changes within the base itself do not necessarily lead to a changed base and thus a changed superstructure. Too many other factors exist within a sociopolitical or socioeconomic arrangement that can compensate for change. "The thesis of productive force determinism... does not generate a theory of a given society's productive relations" (Shaw 165). And finally to even suggest that economics would play such a predominant developmental role would be, by nature, myopic. As Karl Federn concluded, most "superstructure" systems are aware of the idiosyncratic characteristics of their economies (132). He goes on to say that history, when applied to economics, is mute primarily because we know so little of the past relationship between the two. Aside from the twentieth century, statistics and inferential analysis of economies have been subjective and mostly conjectural. To use economics as a determinant of the probable development of history would

prove fruitless indeed (132). It does not follow then that economic determinism should play even a secondary role in historical determinism as Marx tends to allow.

Thirdly, we must consider that which Marx termed "class conflict." He used this rather broad-sweeping term to connote all of history and yet he only vaguely defines class struggle using the dialectical method. This creates more problems for Marx because his theory concludes that all of history is change brought about by the uneven distribution of material productivity. This may not necessarily be the case and so history would have to conform to his theory instead of vice versa.

While Marx would say that class conflict is struggle, characterized by antagonist forces competing for the modes of productivity, history does not lead us in this direction. Henri See notes that "up to the present, ...history has recorded no revolution which was, properly speaking, a conflict of antagonistic classes" (107). Most revolutions, even when provoked by social or economic factors, have been focused on the political elites and on their reformation, not on destruction (See 107). The French

Revolution, for example, went on to reform the legal system of that country and not the economic system (See 110). Marx also decides that society and history will finish in the catastrophic revolution of the proletariat over the bourgeoisie. Again, history has typically shown that change takes place at a gradual pace rather than through quick and complete transformations (See 110). Without this rapid metamorphosis the tenet put forward by Marx seems impaired in trying to represent what the culmination of his principles should produce.

The other problem of class conflict returns us to dialectics. In Marxist thought the distinction between conflict and contradiction is blurred somewhat. Heilbroner says that the differences between these two in nature are more apparent and discernible. However, with social change things are different

(85). For conflict to merit contradiction it must be embedded in the process of change in a "contradictory" manner and bond two antagonistic and incompatible processes into one conceptual unity (Heilbroner 85). Since this is not universally the case with social change, we cannot apply the dialectical in all cases because to do so would dilute its universal nature within Marxist thought (Heilbroner 85). And yet without its complete application we force the materialist conception to become selective and arbitrary, which renders invalid its purpose as the theory of historical evolution in the past, present, and future.

The final point of contention with the theory of historical materialism comes from the assertion Marx made about the theory. For him it represented a science, an empirical method by which all of history could be tested and analyzed, and which could accordingly present an accurate prediction of the history man had yet to make. In fact it was this belief that led Marx to say that his theory was superior to all others because of its positive qualities. And yet the more earnestly one analyzes it the less scientific and factual this claim seems to be. Problems with the assertion of historical empiricism developed at its origins. If one will recall, the whole basis for this premise came from the metaphysical/philosophical background in which Marx's academic career began. As Acton points out, Marx's claim was one of hard science and yet his conclusions end with the advent of a superior society from the ashes of capitalism, one in which class and exploitation end. It seems difficult to rationalize how the goal of a moral superlative can be spawned by scientific theorization (Acton 16). It is here, then, that it becomes apparent that the Marxian view remains a moral imperative grounded in philosophy, and one in which scientific objectivity plays no part (Acton 16).

Moreover, there exist no particular laws of nature which could come to serve as the basis of historical science. And how can one come to test that which has already been established as

an historical fact. Historical facts lend themselves only to interpretation and not to empirical testing that has no realistic parameters to govern its legitimacy. Shaw asserts this view when he examines the base-superstructure connection. He concludes that "if that connection varies with each individual society so that it can only be brought through case studies, then the path,... does not lead to the disclosure of the type of regularities that would make history scientific" (68). The thoughts of Jordan only go to further this position when he notes that "if Marx believed that his theory of history could be validated by testing the conclusions derived from it, as a hypothesis of natural science is tested, he was surely on the wrong track; it is clear today that no historical hypothesis can be validated in this way" (305).

Through the consideration of these authors and the application of rationality, it becomes increasingly apparent that Marx did not have the precise view of history that he was putting forward, but moreover, he was using the guise of science as a vehicle for his moral aims (Acton 16). His empiricism becomes clouded because of the nature by which one must analyze history. This smacks of relativism, and thus invalidity, and the corresponding downfall of historical materialism.

III. ANALYTICAL CONCLUSIONS

Upon looking at the entire breadth of historical materialism I think that it becomes apparent that there is one theme that runs consistently throughout the work, and more importantly, in its application to the natural world. I find it all too ironic that the basis of my overall analysis of historical materialism returns to the realm of philosophical notions that Marx so desperately fought to leave behind. To wit, the omnipresent factor in all of Marxist historicism is that it is pervaded by the notion of relativism by virtue of the very subject it seeks to understand.

This fatal criticism could not be lodged against Marx, per say, had he not been so intently bent on proving the ultimate and seemingly predestined course for history and development. By limiting his theory to the final outcome of society and establishing the premises under which this progression would occur, Marx crossed a line that has doomed his theory to failure. Should one event ever occur that does not follow his outlined course of progress then his theory will be invalidated. This notion is aggravated by the fact that he uses unidirectional dialecticism to steer societal evolution. Should the aforementioned nonconformist event happen, it will represent divergence from the path and trigger the loss of the dialectical motivation. And how can it be that Marx has decided the only truth for the development of history? How can it be that he was so acutely aware of the changes and developments in technology, politics, science, education, health care, religion, industry, moreover the factors of production? He could not.

To say that all of history has been and will be that of class struggle based on economic inequality is to overlook the possibilities for relations to correct themselves without transformation of the socioeconomic order. Marxist history must be applied to all situations in a relative sense in order to be applicable. The changes in the relations of productivity must be considered in the context of the here and now. All factors that are present serve a mitigating purpose in the ultimate consideration of the outcome of history. To say that all events have and will be for the same ends and means ignores the "what if" possibility of nonconformity. It necessitates the bonded will of men to progress in a fashion that is presumed to be of a higher purpose. But again, to assume all societal development occurs and achieves a higher purpose reasserts the question of relativity. If society does develop, who is to say it is a development toward superiority; what is this superiority contrasted against?

Yet there is more to my critique than personal speculation.

Richard DeGeorge shares this sense of relative relations when he writes:

On these grounds, however, the Manifesto itself, since it reflects the conditions of Europe of 1848, remains valid only as long as those conditions remain the same; but as these change, the values enunciated by the Manifesto change. The extent to which Marx would be willing to accept the relativity of the Manifesto is open to speculation, though he could maintain his position consistently only by doing so (61).

Jordan extends this pattern to economics when he concludes that change from one system to another affords new principles and ideals to develop which he likens to biological evolution (311). Such an evolution in beliefs and their application would likely produce a superstructure that is flexible and resilient to change and its results. Change, then, becomes incumbent on the thoughts and desires of those making the change and is not locked into a predetermined course of development that leads only to one finality. Examples of such differences in development are trade unionism and embourgeoisement of the working class. Neither of these tenets existed at the time Marx formulated his thoughts of history, and yet both show how the working class has been placated under capitalism and that the "sense" of relative exploitation and isolation have diminished. This is more acutely apparent in the fact that no major world capitalist system has made a move toward communism. Many would say that this is due to the pliant nature of capitalism. Jurgen Harbermoss noted that capitalism of Marx's day saw a clear separation between productive and political forces. These have been more closely integrated due to technical advancement and the complexity of modern economies (Kolakowski 391).

This lowers the degree to which workers are alienated and changes our perspective on both production and government since the time of Marx. Today our expectations are different relative to the nature of our systems, and thus what was once considered exploitation may today be considered a necessity for progress. Again it is all relative to the origins of the theory as it is juxtaposed on modern society. Put simply, what was once bad could very well become good over time and vice versa. It is all dependent on the perception of the people. And since it is their perceptions that alter society as change comes about, then it becomes most apparent that developmental evolution will occur according to the relative understanding of individuals in relation to their society and its means of material existence. It is this relative nature within the context of change that undermines the materialist conception of history and its rigid outline for yesterday and tomorrow. People by nature are adaptive, and since they make history, it stands to reason that their history will be flexible and adaptable as well.

The materialist conception of history should not be totally dislodged from its place in analysis though, for it has revolutionized the manner in which societies consider their adaptation and progress as it is related to their modes of productivity, their superstructure, and ultimately their base. Through its development as a theory and its continual criticisms, it has maintained itself in the annals of philosophy and has served the interest of Marxists the world over. When one considers these changes, which, in and of themselves, represent development and progression of one sort or another, then the criticisms levied against Marx tend to diminish. Under this context it then becomes possible to appreciate Marx, his theory, and its implications for what they truly are: an attempt by humanity to come to grips with itself through heightened understanding of its past, and a method for dealing with the uncertainties of the future. The relevancy of the correctness of the materialist conception of

history is indeterminable when considered alongside other schools of thought. Moreover, it is the intent, or that drive to establish a system under which the organization of society could see its true actualization, which makes the efforts of Karl Marx as noble and credible as any other.

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Senator Margaret Chase Smith's
"Declaration of Conscience:"
An Early Response to
McCarthyism

Merle W. Underwood

On June 1, 1950, Margaret Chase Smith, freshman senator from Maine, stood before the United States Senate and spoke harsh words of condemnation against the prevailing national hysteria which would forever be known as "McCarthyism." Heaping blame on Democrats and Republicans alike, Senator Smith assailed their lack of leadership in failing to act to halt the use of fear and character assassination for political gain. This "Declaration of Conscience" sounded a call to reaffirm and reinforce those basic American rights being destroyed by a remedy that was more insidious and deadly than the disease Senator Joseph R. McCarthy proported to cure.

In studying Senator Smith's "Declaration of Conscience," it is necessary to understand the mood of the United States during the late nineteen-forties and early fifties. America had fought and won, at great expense in lives and money, a global war. Her citizens looked forward to a long period of peace, prosperity, and freedom from fear. Instead the Cold War was intensifying, with the East-West controversy over control of Berlin escalating. With the arrests and prosecutions of Alger Hiss and Judith Coplon, Americans were becoming increas-

ingly aware that Communist infiltrators could penetrate the highest levels of government. This growing uncertainty about the nation's security was exacerbated by the revelation that the Soviet Union, by using secret information stolen from the United States, had developed and detonated an atomic bomb. Responding to this threat, President Harry Truman ordered the Atomic Energy Commission to begin development of a hydrogen bomb. Although people were confused and afraid, they were eager to embrace a champion who was ready and willing to do battle against the Red Menace. By 1950, "America was ripe for Joe McCarthy" (Adams 24).

Joseph McCarthy's first term as senator from Wisconsin had been unimpressive. In fact, late in 1949, he had been voted "the worst U.S. Senator" by Senate news correspondents (Adams 20). Looking forward to the upcoming election, McCarthy badly needed an issue guaranteed to win the votes necessary to return him to Congress. Ever the opportunist, he saw the Communist subversion scare as the right vehicle on which to ride to victory. In his biography of the Wisconsin senator, Lately Thomas wrote that, while Senator McCarthy recognized "...it [a victory] would call for a fighter," there was no doubt that "Joe was a fighter." Thomas explained that "...in political matters McCarthy often showed a keen sense of timing, and his political judgment ...was usually shrewd" (85). From McCarthy's somewhat offhand and insincere dedication to ridding the country of the evils of Communism mushroomed what Thomas called "...next to war, the most prolonged and profound political upheaval to shake the United States during the first half of this century" (3).

It was Owen Lattimore, a Johns Hopkins professor who had worked closely with the State Department in formulating Far Eastern policy in the forties, who was credited with first using the term "McCarthyism." Lattimore himself had been smeared with McCarthy's "red paint." While Senator Mc-

Carthy bragged that the term was a "badge of honor," to those who found his tactics abhorrent, it "...connoted reckless accusation, smearing, disregard for truth, lying, equivocation, guilt by association, [and] character assassination" (Thomas 151). Joseph McCarthy became a master of making unfounded and unproven charges against American citizens from "...the highest levels of government...through businesses and factories, publishing houses, courthouses, executive suites, Hollywood, academe, churches and communities" (Adams 92). No one was immune from his denunciations and there seemed little that one could do to protect himself, for McCarthy could and did hide from retaliation behind the immunity provided by his Senate office. In his book depicting the McCarthy era, John G. Adams said:

The ingredients of McCarthyism began to emerge. It began with a senator's privilege to make accusations without fear of libel actions. This would then be spread through the medium of the bold-faced headline, where it would reach a huge and receptive audience, drawing strength from a deep well of suspicion, fear and hate (25).

Suddenly Joe McCarthy was the most powerful and feared political force in Congress. Other congressmen were frightened of what he might do to them politically if they opposed him. Even President Truman refused to publicly oppose him or his tactics. Senator McCarthy had a stranglehold on the country and few were willing to cross him. Those congressmen who tried, such as Maryland's Millard Tydings and Illinois' Scott Lucas, soon found themselves rejected by the voters and replaced by someone more "pro-Joe." McCarthy had turned into "a giant killer" (Oshinsky 176).

It was into this atmosphere of intimidation and fear that

Margaret Chase Smith stepped forward and made an impassioned plea for fairness, political integrity, and unity against the "...Four Horsemen of Calumny--Fear, Ignorance, Bigotry, and Smear." She encouraged the lawmakers to remember their obligations to the American people and "...to uphold and defend the Constitution...which speaks not only of the freedom of speech but also of trial by jury instead of trial by accusation." Smith reminded the Senate of the "...basic principles of Americanism-- the right to criticize; the right to hold unpopular beliefs; the right to protest; [and] the right of independent thought." An American citizen should not, she said, "...be in danger of losing his reputation or livelihood merely because he happens to know someone who holds unpopular beliefs." Smith chastised the gentlemen for seeking "...selfish political gain at the sacrifice of individual reputations and national unity." Declaring that the Senate had become "...a forum of hate and character assassination sheltered by congressional immunity," and warning that it had "played directly into the Communist design of `confuse, divide and conquer,'" she concluded with a plea that they stop "...thinking as Republicans and Democrats about elections and start thinking patriotically as Americans" (Congressional Record). Senator Smith never spoke the name of Joseph McCarthy, but everyone who heard her knew that this senator from Wisconsin was the target of her remarks.

What prompted Mrs. Smith to take an unprecedented and unpopular stand against such a political powerhouse as Senator McCarthy? By her own admission, Smith had worked well with McCarthy when she first came to the Senate. She had served with him on the Permanent Investigation Sub-Committee which he, at that time, had chaired. When McCarthy first began to accuse certain, always unnamed, government workers of being Communist spies, she was impressed by his dedication to the rooting out of "Red influence." It was only after he failed to respond to her repeated requests for documentation of the

charges that she began to doubt his credibility.

Like Senator McCarthy, Margaret Chase Smith herself was something of a fighter. She had come to Washington with her husband Clyde, a Republican Congressman from Maine, where she worked by his side as a respected and valued adviser. Upon his death in 1940, she was appointed to take his place in the House of Representatives, and she was elected to and served four two-year terms in the House before being elected to the United States Senate in 1949. Friends had advised her that she was foolish to aspire to the Senate, that she had reached the peak of her career, and that, if she ran for higher office, she would be defeated. Mrs. Smith wrote, "...instead of resigning myself to going downhill, I determined to go up" (4). This determination to fight the odds and win served her well. During her three terms in the Senate, she was always able to hold her own, particularly in her fight against McCarthyism.

In her book, Declaration of Conscience, Smith gives a step-by-step account of her working relationship with Senator McCarthy and the reasoning process she followed in deciding that his charges lacked validity. She tells of her initial belief in his cause and of an interest so intense that she would "...make it a point to go to the Senate Floor repeatedly to listen to his speeches" (7).

She thought the photostatic copies of proof he claimed to possess sounded impressive, and after repeated requests to view them, she finally was allowed to do so. However, Smith was at a loss to understand their relevance to the charges McCarthy was making. Smith at first concluded that the fault lay, not with Senator McCarthy's documentation, but with herself. She thought that since she was not a lawyer, perhaps she was just not learned enough to understand the paperwork. It did not take long, however, for Smith to learn otherwise. Her doubts about McCarthy's evidence became even stronger until she "...became convinced that he simply was not going to come up with

any proof to substantiate his charges" (Smith 8).

What, though, actually caused this freshman senator from Maine to take such an unpopular stand against the actions of her colleague? It has been suggested that Senator Smith entertained the hope that she would be the 1952 Republican candidate for Vice President. Newsweek quoted her as saying, "The Party that nominates a woman...will win the 1952 election" (25). It is thus possible that her dramatic speech before the Senate was a bid for attention and support for her candidacy. Needless to say, it certainly was an attention-getting move. Senator Smith herself stated, "... in those days, freshman Senators were to be seen and not heard" (9). Also, it broke with tradition for senators to speak out against members of their own party. Smith reached the conclusion that she must step forward when it became apparent that there would be no challenge from the Democrat side of the Aisle. She was often referred to by her colleagues as a "quiet woman" because she rarely spoke in the Senate, and yet her good friend and adviser William C. Lewis, Jr. warned that "...to call her quiet can be seriously misleading, for she does not shun or avoid involvement" (Smith viii). The decision to take a stand against McCarthyism (although she never used that term) at a time "...when men have caviled and equivocated and slandered, ...increased her stature..." and "caused certain of her irresponsible colleagues to become mutes--at least for the moment" (Ickes 16).

There has been presented another, rather far-fetched, reason for Smith's denouncement of Senator McCarthy. Yet another of McCarthy's biographers, Thomas Reeves, wrote that McCarthy privately had told Smith that she was his personal choice for Vice President. This was corroborated by Mrs. Smith in her book. Reeves, however, also speculated that there was a more personal relationship between the two senators. Reeves points out that McCarthy had the reputation in Washington of being a "ladies' man" and that Mrs. Smith was a widow.

Reeves also suggests that Mrs. Smith may have placed too much trust in McCarthy's flattery and, when he attempted to cool the relationship, Smith, out of spite, challenged him on the Senate floor (297). Reeves explanations can be easily refuted, however.

While Senator Smith was a newcomer to the Senate, she had served many years in the House of Representatives and was obviously not a naive girl just arrived in the big city. She was far too politically savvy to have been misled by Senator McCarthy's blandishments. This "woman scorned" theory is highly improbable. It is more realistic to assume that the soft-spoken lady from Maine had searched her conscience and decided that she could no longer remain silent about a situation that she believed would "...result in national suicide and the end of everything that...Americans hold dear" (Congressional Record).

Reaction to Mrs. Smith's speech was varied and, in some cases, non-existent. Having been forewarned by Smith that she would be addressing the Senate and that he would not like what she would say, Senator McCarthy sat grim-faced and silent throughout the speech. Immediately after she had completed her remarks, he stalked from the Floor. The following day, McCarthy defiantly declared that his "...fight against Communism..." would not stop, "...regardless of what any group in this Senate...may do." He continued, "I hold myself accountable not to them, but first to the people of my state, and secondly to the people of the nation, and thirdly to civilization as a whole" (White 8). He dubbed Senator Smith and the seven Republican senators who officially supported her Declaration "...Snow White and the Seven Dwarfs" (Smith 21). Senator McCarthy later sought revenge by ousting Senator Smith from the Permanent Investigation Sub-Committee. Ignoring her bitter protests, he explained to the press, "It's not right to say she was bumped. She was promoted to another highly important job"

(Time 9).

Although there was overall little commotion caused by this speech, several senators did step forward and praise Mrs. Smith. Senator Bob Hendrickson found her address "...inspiring and thought provoking," and Senator Herbert Lehman said, "She has said the things which are in our minds and hearts." Senator Millard Tydings applauded her effort as the "...highest level of statesmanship" (Congressional Record). As a whole, however, the Senate remained silent. As Senator Smith would later explain, "Joe had the Senate paralyzed with fear" (Reeves 298). President Harry Truman laughingly remarked to reporters that "he wouldn't want to say anything that bad about the Republican Party," but at a luncheon privately praised Senator Smith's stand as being "...one of the finest things that has happened to her in Washington in all [his] years in the Senate and in the White House" (Smith 20).

Media coverage was also varied in response. Newsweek featured Senator Smith in a cover story and praised her Declaration as being "...as neat as a broom sweeping out a mess" (24). In an article entitled "And a Woman Shall Lead Them," Harold Ickes, former Secretary of Interior, called Mrs. Smith a "courageous American statesman" and urged the prompt impeachment of McCarthy (16). Time had a lead article reporting segments of the speech but refrained from making any judgment. Interestingly, the two Birmingham newspapers failed to report the speech. It was only mentioned in brief editorial remarks in which the Declaration was "welcomed" (Post Herald 8).

There existed also a few rather unusual recognitions resulting from Senator Smith's speech. Not only was she chosen to be among the "Ten Best Tailored Women in the World," but she was also selected as being the "Best Tailored in Government." The United States Air Force offered her a reserve commission as a Lieutenant Colonel, and the Russian

press, despite the fact that she is only a little more than five feet in height, dubbed Smith an "Amazon warmonger" (Smith 21).

For all of its simple eloquence, Senator Smith's speech evinced little support. Of the original seven Republican senators who endorsed her Declaration, six soon abandoned the fight. Only Senator Wayne Morse remained firm in his commitment. Adams wrote that, while "Mrs. Smith remained undaunted by McCarthy...by 1953 she truly stood alone. McCarthy was able to bully virtually everyone else in the government" (101).

Margaret Chase Smith's "Declaration of Conscience" did nothing to precipitate Joseph McCarthy's downfall or to put a halt to the witchhunt which he engineered. One reason that the speech was ineffective was the timing; it occurred at too early a date. The American people were enamored with their hero. Senator McCarthy had exploited his office to the fullest by his use of immunity and manipulation of the press. Many Americans had a basic faith in him as a United States Senator and when he spoke, "...they assumed he was 'the voice of the republic...the voice of the government'" (Oshinsky 170). The onset of the Korean War, instead of diverting attention from McCarthy's antics, added to his momentum. America had depended on her nuclear superiority as a deterrent against another war, but suddenly she was faced with enemies as potentially powerful as she. The source of this deadly power lay in secret information stolen from the United States by Communist spies. A majority of Americans believed that, in the case of Senator McCarthy and his investigations, the end justified the means.

Another reason that the Declaration had limited impact was that Senator Smith had little political clout. She was generally well-liked and respected for her integrity, but she "...was hardly a powerhouse in the upper chamber" (Oshinsky 163). It is Oshinsky's opinion that none of the group sponsoring the Declaration was influential enough to command a direct

attack on Senator McCarthy, to plan strategy, and to enlist recruits to the cause. Certainly this band of eight Republicans was not prepared to actively oppose the powerful allies of McCarthy (164). While Senator Smith was one tough lady, it is doubtful that any of the co-sponsors were willing to fight on the same level as McCarthy. One Senator quipped, "He who plays with a pup, gets licked in the face" (Oshinsky 163). It was also certain that no one in the Senate or the Executive Branch was willing to engage in a gutter fight.

The most plausible reason for the lack of response was that while many deplored the tactics used by Senator McCarthy and his cohorts, few could deny that Communist infiltration posed a real danger to American government. Moreover, no one had devised a successful alternative method of solving the problem. McCarthy's

fight against Communist subversion had in the beginning been a political ploy to win votes, but he soon became obsessed with what to him was a crusade. At this time, though, few doubted his sincerity and "...they could not lightly dismiss his charges" (Oshinsky 163).

It was not Margaret Chase Smith who brought Joseph McCarthy's crusade, and for all practical purposes his career, to an end. It was neither the Republican Party nor the Democrats. It was the man himself who finally put an end to an intolerable national trauma. He had called Harry Truman "a son of a bitch" and had insinuated that the President was a drunkard. He had publicly affronted senators from both political parties, and had demeaned the highly honored General George C. Marshall by accusing him of aiding the cause of Communism. "In so many words..." McCarthy "...called the general a traitor to his country" (Oshinsky 200). When he accused the Army of blackmail and bribery in its efforts to protect members of the military against whom the senator had made accusations, President Dwight Eisenhower finally de-

cided it was time to take action. The President privately told advisers, "I've made up my mind that you can't do business with Joe, and to hell with any attempt at compromise" (Oshinsky 407). A full-fledged investigation was inevitable, and for the first time Senator McCarthy was placed on the defensive.

There had also been a change in the attitude of the nation since that June day in 1950 when Senator Smith had pleaded for national unity. By 1954 the tensions of the Cold War had eased. First one and then another of his fellow congressmen had spoken out against McCarthy, and his grip of fear had lessened. More important than these things, his popularity with the public had begun to wane. There was a growing discontent with his performance and, in his home state of Wisconsin, there was even a recall movement under way. These conditions were aggravated by Senator McCarthy's long-time drinking problem and resultant severe health complications. The Senator was in a poor position to take on such adversaries as the United States Army and its Commander-in-Chief. He confided to a constituent that he believed he "...must win his fight or die in the attempt" (Oshinsky 412). The latter of these alternatives came to fruition.

The hearings that resulted from the Army/McCarthy charges and counter-charges were eagerly watched on television by an entire nation. Senator McCarthy had to step down as Committee Chairman and was unable to control the proceedings and manipulate the media as he had done at so many past investigations. Across the land Americans could see and hear for themselves this man to whom they had looked as a champion of democracy. What a revelation that was! They saw him "...glowering, menacing, breaking in with incessant points of order" (Fried 282). They heard first hand "...his windy speeches, his frightening outbursts, his crude personal attacks" (Oshinsky 464). A Gallup Poll showed that McCarthy's popularity rating had dropped to 30 percent. He had lost the

support of the people, and without that support his crusade became ineffective. Ultimately, he became "...a liability to his party and an embarrassment to all but his closest friends" (Oshinsky 482).

The significance of Margaret Chase Smith's "Declaration of Conscience" lay, not in the response it elicited or the results it brought about, but in the fact that Senator Smith, a woman who ranked low in the government hierarchy, had the intestinal fortitude to venture where the most powerful men in the nation hesitated to tread. Her purpose in speaking out was not to lay low a giant, but to open the eyes of government and of the country to the inherent danger that lay in allowing one man to hold unchallenged power over an entire nation. Smith did not single-handedly stop McCarthy, but she set an example of courage and political integrity that would lead her more timid colleagues to finally take a positive stand against a man who, in his zeal to eradicate the Communist influence in America, threatened to destroy those rights guaranteed by the Constitution of the United States. Perhaps Mr. Ickes was right when he wrote, "It was better than well that, confronting the leaderless mass, should stand forth a woman rather than a man to point the way back to the homely and decent Americanism which we use to take as much for granted as the air that we breathe" (16).

Appendix
Margaret Chase Smith's
"Declaration of Conscience"
United States Senate -- June 1, 1950

Mr. President:

I would like to speak briefly and simply about a serious national condition. It is a national feeling of fear and frustration that could result in national suicide and the end of everything that we Americans hold dear. It is a condition that comes from the lack of effective leadership in either the

Legislative Branch or the Executive Branch of our Government.

That leadership is so lacking that serious and responsible proposals are being made that national advisory commissions be appointed to provide such critically needed leadership.

I speak as briefly as possible because too much harm has already been done with irresponsible words of bitterness and selfish political opportunism. I speak as simply as possible because the issue is too great to be obscured by eloquence. I speak simply and briefly in the hope that my words will be taken to heart. I speak as a Republican. I speak as a woman. I speak as a United States Senator. I speak as an American.

The United States Senate has long enjoyed worldwide respect as the greatest deliberative body in the world. But recently that deliberative character has too often been debased to the level of a forum of hate and character assassination sheltered by the shield of congressional immunity.

It is ironical that we Senators can in debate in the Senate, directly or indirectly, by any form of words impute to any American, who is not a Senator, any conduct or motive unworthy or unbecoming an American -- and without that non-Senator American having any legal redress against us--yet if we say the thing in the Senate about our colleagues we can be stopped on the grounds of being out of order.

It is strange that we can verbally attack anyone else without restraint and with full protection and yet we hold ourselves above the same type of criticism here on the Senate Floor. Surely the United States Senate is big enough to take self-criticism and self-appraisal. Surely we should be able to take the same kind of character attacks that we "dish out" to outsiders.

I think it is high time for the United States Senate and its members to do some soul searching -- for us to weigh our consciences -- on the manner in which we are performing our duty to the people of America -- on the manner in which we are using or abusing our individual powers and privileges.

I think that it is high time that we remembered that we have sworn to uphold and defend the Constitution. I think that it is high time that we remembered that the Constitution, as amended, speaks not only of the freedom of speech but also of trial by jury instead of trial by accusation.

Whether it be a criminal prosecution in court or a character prosecution in the Senate, there is little practical distinction when the life of a person has been ruined.

Those of us who shout the loudest about Americanism in making character assassinations are all too frequently those who, by our own words and acts, ignore some of the basic principles of Americanism --

The right to criticize;

The right to hold unpopular beliefs;

The right to protest;
The right of independent thought.

The exercise of these rights should not cost one single American citizen his reputation or his right to a livelihood nor should he be in danger of losing his reputation or livelihood merely because he happens to know someone who holds unpopular beliefs. Who of us doesn't? Otherwise none of us could call our souls our own. Otherwise thought control would have set in.

The American people are sick and tired of being afraid to speak their minds lest they be politically smeared as "Communists" or "Fascists" by their opponents. Freedom of speech is not what it used to be in America. It has been so abused by some that it is not exercised by others.

The American people are sick and tired of seeing innocent people smeared and guilty people whitewashed. But there have been enough proved cases to cause nationwide distrust and strong suspicion that there may be something to the unproved, sensational accusations.

As a Republican, I say to my colleagues on this side of the aisle that the Republican Party faces a challenge today that is not unlike the challenge that it faced back in Lincoln's day. The Republican Party so successfully met that challenge that it emerged from the Civil War as the champion of a united nation -- in addition to being a Party that unrelentingly fought loose spending and loose programs.

Today our country is being psychologically divided by the confusion and the suspicions that are bred in the United States Senate to spread like cancerous tentacles of "know nothing, suspect everything" attitudes. Today we have a Democratic Administration that has developed a mania for loose spending and loose programs. History is repeating itself -- and the Republican Party again has the opportunity to emerge as the champion of unity and prudence.

The record of the present Democratic Administration has provided us with sufficient campaign issues without the necessity of resorting to political smears. America is rapidly losing its position as leader of the world simply because the Democratic Administration has pitifully failed to provide effective leadership.

The Democratic Administration has completely confused the American people by its daily contradictory grave warnings and optimistic assurances--that show the people that our Democratic Administration has no idea of where it is going.

The Democratic Administration has greatly lost the confidence of the American people by its complacency to the threat of communism here at home and the leak of vital secrets to Russia through key officials of the Democratic Administration. There are enough proved cases to make this

point without diluting our criticism with unproved charges.

Surely these are sufficient reasons to make it clear to the American people that it is time for a change and that a Republican victory is necessary to the security of this country. Surely it is clear that this nation will continue to suffer as long as it is governed by the present ineffective Democratic Administration.

Yet to displace it with a Republican regime embracing a philosophy that lacks political integrity or intellectual honesty would prove equally disastrous to this nation. The nation sorely needs a Republican victory. But I don't want to see the Republican Party ride to political victory on the Four Horsemen of Calumny --Fear, Ignorance, Bigotry and Smear.

I doubt if the Republican Party could -- simply because I don't believe the American people will uphold any political party that put political exploitation above national interest. Surely we Republicans aren't that desperate for victory.

I don't want to see the Republican Party win that way. While it might be a fleeting victory for the Republican Party, it would be a more lasting defeat for the American people. Surely it would ultimately be suicide for the Republican Party and the two-party system that has protected our American liberties from the dictatorship of a one-party system.

As members of the Minority Party, we do not have the primary authority to formulate the policy of our Government. But we do have the responsibility of rendering constructive criticism, of clarifying issues, of allaying fears by acting as responsible citizens.

As a woman, I wonder how the mothers, wives, sisters and daughters feel about the way in which members of their families have been politically mangled in Senate debate -- and I use the word "debate" advisedly.

As a United States Senator, I am not proud of the way in which the Senate has been made a publicity platform for irresponsible sensationalism. I am not proud of the reckless abandon in which unproved charges have been hurled from this side of the aisle. I am not proud of the obviously staged, undignified counter-charges that have been attempted in retaliation from the other side of the aisle.

I don't like the way the Senate has been made a rendezvous for vilification, for selfish political gain at the sacrifice of individual reputations and national unity. I am not proud of the way we smear outsiders from the Floor of the Senate and hide behind the cloak of congressional immunity and still place ourselves beyond criticism on the Floor of the Senate.

As an American, I am shocked at the way Republicans and Democrats alike are playing directly into the Communist design of "confuse, divide and conquer." As an American, I don't want a Democratic Administration "white wash" or "cover up" any more than I want a Republican smear or

witch hunt.

As an American, I condemn a Republican "Fascist" just as much as I condemn a Democratic "Communist." They are equally dangerous to you and me and to our country. As an American, I want to see our nation recapture the strength and unity it once had when we fought the enemy instead of ourselves.

It is with these thoughts that I have drafted what I call a "Declaration of Conscience." I am gratified that Senator Toby, Senator Aiken, Senator Morse, Senator Ives, Senator Thyne and Senator Gendrickson have concurred in that declaration and have authorized me to announce their concurrence.

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Gorbachev's Perestroika: The Failure of Reform

Caroline McDonald

Until recently, only the most knowledgeable specialists and students of Soviet affairs discussed the possibility of internal reform in the Soviet Union. Today, everyone ranging from western commentators to the average businessman is involved in discussions and speculations concerning the future of Soviet internal reform. General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev is recognized as the architect of change in the USSR. Gorbachev's slogans, *glasnost* (speaking out publicly), *perestroika* (restructuring), and *novoye myshleniye* (new thinking), have sparked debate and criticism about the state of the Soviet economy as well as the intent of such slogans and/or reforms. Because of the recent unusual events in the Soviet Union, it is important that the West carefully consider the question of economic and social reform if we are to comprehend the present and future course of Soviet affairs. Unfortunately, the question is terribly ambiguous. Reform, what does that mean? Reform what, for what purpose, and for whom? Not only is the concept of reform ambiguous, but so too is the type of success reform can hope for.

I propose that the reforms described by Gorbachev's

slogans are doomed to failure. First the reforms introduced by Gorbachev up to now are not practical reforms but rather a shifting of old content. Second, the economic reforms necessary to achieve true economic growth will promote pluralism which will bring about the fall of communism. In order to preserve the communist system, true reforms must not take place. Gorbachev hopes that his "restructuring" will do enough to relieve economic and political stress without establishing pluralism as most true reforms do.

Perestroika and *glasnost*, what are they, and what do they really mean? Translated, *glasnost* means to speak out publicly, and *perestroika* means to restructure; but these are mere slogans. These trademarks represent Gorbachev's overall program of accelerating the development of the USSR. Gorbachev launched his reorganization campaign nation-wide at the Twenty-Seventh CPSU Congress. At the Congress, Gorbachev outlined his campaign and immediate targets. Bohdan Harasymiv discusses a series of ways Gorbachev prescribes to implement reorganization, none of which entail true reorganization in the sense of formal structural changes. Most importantly, the "reorganization" of party work requires a renewal of the content of the work of the *apparatus* and its reorientation toward the current priority tasks. These priority tasks consist of the speeding up of scientific and technological progress, strengthening law and order, focusing on organization and efficiency, as well as becoming more economical (Harasymiv 63). Thus, the primary component of "reorganization" is a new style of work and management rather than a genuine reform of the *apparatus*.

Another integral component involves the search for new solutions to problems. More independence is required of party members and committees to find new ways to solve current problems. This in itself presents a problem because these individuals have no recipe for forming new methods of problem

solving. Also involved is an attempt to reorient the public to the new ideas involved in the reform of the entire system. This is a prime example of a different style rather than a true reform of *apparat*. Increased attention to individuals, their needs, and their demands is also incorporated into reorganization. This boils down to the raising of labor productivity by maintaining more effective discipline, law, and order. Again, this is an example of additional change as opposed to restructuring the system. The next component involves personnel -- those unable to implement Gorbachev's policy of "reorganization" should be fired. Another important aspect, as outlined by Gorbachev, is an emphasis by the party press on the psychological reconstruction of cadres. This is probably the most difficult part of *perestroika* because it demands a change in consciousness and manner of thinking. Finally, there must exist an improved leadership style -- a more dynamic and energetic presence (Harasymiv 64).

The latter of these components of restructuring can be easily improved. Leadership style can be strengthened by exercising openness, or *glasnost*. This *glasnost*, however, must include the opening of party operations, the involvement of more rank-and-file, as well as more reports to the public about officials and official functions.

It appears that Gorbachev's policy of "reorganization" is a misnomer. Gorbachev's components involve no new tasks and no new goals. They do, however, involve a reshuffling of content as well as a change of attitudes and style. There are no mentions of abolishing committees or the creation of new bodies. Gorbachev is not so much focused on reorganizing the system as he is on trying to improve operations by attacking bureaucratic problems. This is why his reforms are destined to failure. Stirring the stew does not improve its taste.

Not only does Gorbachev's policy lack real change, but William Odom even accuses the General Secretary of being

reminiscent of Lenin. "Gorbachev's June 1987 plenum report is reminiscent of Lenin calling for worker discipline and Stalin's lectures, "Fundamentals of Leninism." As one reads further, "Gorbachev wants a theoretical advance similar to that achieved by Karl Marx from his examination of the Paris commune and to Lenin's advances in the early years of Soviet rule" (Odom 19). Odom's comparisons of Gorbachev's goals and style to that of Lenin and Marx make one question Gorbachev's commitment to an absolute restructuring of the communist system.

William Odom goes on to make the point that Gorbachev claims that *perestroika* is a goal to be achieved over a long period of time that must be attained by the people, not the leadership (19). Emphasizing this point, Gorbachev seems to be placing the burden of the success of *perestroika* on the masses rather than on his competence as a leader to achieve the goals of his supposed "newly- articulated" policy.

Gorbachev's timetable for the completion of *perestroika* is almost as vague and ambiguous as is the policy itself. This policy of reform and reorganization does not carry with it the rhetoric of decentralization and systematic change found in the West. Far from it, the policy sounds more like the first five-year plan of the late 1920's or the Khrushchev reforms of the 1960's. We have no indication of when Gorbachev's "reforms" are going to take place. Let us now turn from the components of Gorbachev's restructuring to the question of just how far these reforms can take the USSR.

For all the excitement of revolutionary reform in the Soviet Union associated with *perestroika* and *glasnost*, Gorbachev's actual reorganization appears very mild. This is because when we look at the party *apparatus*, nothing has been changed. Policies have not been altered. Gorbachev has not created new structures; he has only rearranged the content of existing ones. Bohdan Harasymiv explains how Gorbachev has reactivated old

structures, such as the network of auditing commissions.

"Their mandate has been broadened to include monitoring the performance of the *apparat* rather than just auditing accounts. This is in line with Gorbachev's emphasis, expressed at the January 1987 Plenum, on the greater need for strengthening oversight and reinforcing policing bodies" (63).

The success of *perestroika*, however, will be measured in economic terms. In the USSR, there exists a link between production and party work.

For any economy to be successful, two functions must be established. First, the authority over factors of production must be established. Second, someone must supply the information about what productive activity to undertake given the resources available (Odom 18). The West handles these factors differently than the East. In the Soviet Union, the administrative structure is handled fairly simply. These functions are cared for by a central planning organization which acts under the authority of the Communist Party. Gosplan, the state planning agency, compiles the annual plans and budgets for every enterprise in the Soviet Union. It is difficult to imagine the tremendous amount of work this entails. Here lies the base to the Soviet economic problem. The Soviet central planning process is not performing the two necessary functions of the economy. It is amazing that the Soviet economy has ever worked (Odom 19).

The fundamental problem with the Soviet system lies in the way the Soviets handle the above-mentioned economic functions, authority over factors of production and what productive activity to undertake with those factors. Let us suppose that Gorbachev wants real systematic change, i.e. change that

increases production, enhances technological growth, and strengthens capital. William Odom offers the criteria for systematic change. He says that systematic change must begin with a major relaxation of central planning and central price formation (Odom 23). Gorbachev recognizes that these steps are necessary to achieve real reorganization, but just how far he can take them is the key. Gorbachev cannot and will not ever reach a level of "major relaxation." Such action could lead to pluralism.

Mr. Odom goes on to discuss the criterion for change. The first criterion is a major shift to market pricing. This shift must create scarcity of information in prices of most goods and services (Odom 23). Gorbachev would have to provide a tremendous amount of free-flowing information in many different areas before this could happen. To date, he has come nowhere near allowing such a flow of information, especially in the banking and technology areas.

Mr. Odom's second criterion is the free flow of information to the degree required for effective market activity. This includes not only domestic economic activity, but also international trade. Without it, domestic economic activity cannot be based on competitive prices, and the *ruble* would become unconvertible.

The third criterion states that legal rights over the factors of production, such as land and capital, must be assured (Odom 24). This would indeed be a very difficult requirement for Gorbachev to meet. Such a reform would promote bourgeois attitudes, as well as establish a division of class. Again, the key is the degree of relaxation. Gorbachev could discuss the possibility of local factory managers deciding their own rate of production, but that is a minute relaxation, not a reorganization of the system. Only a reorganization of the system will bring about true and lasting economic growth and development.

Mr. Odom's criteria suggest true change, change that

would destroy Soviet tradition. However, anything less will fail to meet Gorbachev's challenge. If we were to use Mr. Odom's criteria as a scale, we would have to say that Gorbachev and *perestroika* stop well before accomplishing "true reform." Gorbachev and his reforms can only go as far as his system allows. This is unfortunate, because it is his very system that he is trying to preserve.

The challenge to reform the economic, social and political structure of the Soviet Union is great. The obstacles to the attainment of this goal are numerous. Unfortunately for Gorbachev, these obstacles are not limited to the natural economic barriers, social and political traditions. Among other obstacles are the conservative forces of peers, the system itself that is to be reformed, and the Soviet people.

Gorbachev's peers play a direct role in the success of his reforms. Conservative forces can retard the progress of economic reform. Soviets themselves recognize some of the obstacles facing Gorbachev and the role peers play in his success. Sukhotin and Dement'ev comment on such situations:

Recent practise shows that the conservative forces do not as a rule openly combat the new forms of management but rather attempt to fill them with old content. Thus, the nonobligatory nature of control figures, which are intended to untie the enterprise's hands, are used by the ministry to escalate additional targets, thereby undermining the independence of enterprises. State orders are turning into a new version of value while the old mandatory targets remain in effect (3).

It is almost impossible to overcome these forces in a system that is controlled by its bureaucratic structure.

An article in the Soviet Review, "Restructuring: Quality and Duration," asked members of the Director's Club how certain aspects of restructuring were progressing. G.I. Loginov, chief of a "startup-adjustment" administration, commented on what is being done to stimulate maximum progress in science technology. He also commented on the appreciation of the successes in the reconstruction and retooling of industrial enterprises:

Of late, much has been said and written about restructuring. But unfortunately, much of this has not gone beyond the talking stage. The radical changes for which we are striving are not as yet taking place. Why not? The explanation is that restructuring is an integrated set of measures. It requires radical change throughout the entire system of management and even in the social sphere. This has not as yet happened (Discussion at the Director's Club 12).

Mr. Loginov went on to cite a brief example. The CPSU Central Committee issued a decree on the technical retooling of enterprises stressing the point that technical retooling would be financed by the enterprises, possibly with the help of bank loans. The procedure was outlined in detail. The problem was that the already-existent instructions for technical retooling were still in effect. When the enterprises needed to build the smallest add-on structure, Gosbank required a special decree which was very difficult to obtain. Loginov felt that if he had the right to form a production development fund, he must also have the means of obtaining construction materials (Discussion at the Director's Club 10). This is a practical example of how reorganization has yet to take place. A vague concept seems to be there, but nothing is happening. No effort to change has

taken place. This seems to be the norm for Gorbachev and his campaign for reform.

We can see how government leaders, as well as the Soviet system, limits Gorbachev's reforms. But what about the Soviet people? It appears from recent newspaper articles and polls that the Soviet people are not behind the reforms proposed by Gorbachev. One can easily question the accuracy of such polls, but the amount of information supporting this thought does seem to give it some legitimacy. On my recent visit to the Soviet Union, the people I spoke with questioned the intent of Mr. Gorbachev's reform. They seemed almost fearful of his efforts to reorganize. This reaction is very understandable. The Soviet people could stand to lose a great deal in the near future if reforms were to succeed. High inflation and large unemployment rates would be only the first problems facing the Soviets. If they made it through this first wave, they would then have to confront a reorientation of public consciousness toward the reorganization of the system. Because of what the people have to lose, as well as experiences in the past, the Soviets do not trust Gorbachev or his reforms.

The failure of reforms is due largely to the tremendous amount of resistance facing Gorbachev. Goldman comments on resistance:

The failure of past economic reforms also suggests how deeply entrenched the resistance to change is. A purge of economic administrators and government leaders and an emphasis on discipline does help, but only within limits. The prevailing system seems to resist efforts to reform it, let alone to change its very nature... Among us are people who have difficulty grasping the word *restructuring* and sometimes they have difficulty even pronouncing it (85).

Goldman identifies the failure of reform when he says, "the prevailing system seems to resist efforts to reform it, let alone to change its very nature" (85).

Gorbachev seems to talk in an innovative and stylish manner, but moves traditionally. It might be that he truly believes in reform but it is his system and the people around him that are preventing him from making far-reaching changes. It could be that he is forced to offer only cosmetic adjustments. Or, perhaps Gorbachev realizes that true reform will not only offer his country economic growth, but pluralism as well -- a black curtain for the present system.

Let us turn now to the effect of *perestroika's* success or failure on communism in the Soviet Union. Very simply, the success or failure of *perestroika* will determine the future of communism in the USSR. It is incredible to think that one man, Mikhail Gorbachev, has allowed the future of the communist world to come down to the success or failure of one campaign. Some may argue it was not Gorbachev that brought the fate of communism to this point; it was inevitable. Vladimir Bukovsky explains the situation very well:

The emerging dilemma is truly paradoxical: if the party retains its control over the economy socialism will be endangered and will finally collapse; if, however, the party loses its control over the economy (and, therefore, its control over Soviet society) what Gorbachev calls "the position of socialism in the modern world" will collapse just as surely (62).

In short, the implacable logic of Marxist-Leninist analysis predicts the inevitable demise of communism. Here indeed is a fundamental crisis of ideology and reality that the communists were forced to make from the very beginning. Here is where

it comes together. On the one hand, if Gorbachev fails to provide economic growth and development, which he claims his reforms will provide, and retain control over the economy, socialism will collapse. The tremendous economic problems in the USSR today will become so great that the system will become unable to function, completely halting socialism. On the other hand, if true reorganization and reform is achieved, the party will lose control over the economy. If the Communist Party were to lose control over the economy, they would in turn lose control over the Soviet society itself. Gorbachev is trying to strengthen his system without causing its collapse. He recognizes the fine line he is walking. By talking about sweeping reforms, he is leaving the impression that he is not retaining control over the economy. By not actually establishing practical changes, he is avoiding the loss of control. Gorbachev is taking a big gamble.

It is obvious that Gorbachev's reforms will fail primarily because they are not true reforms, or those that are proposed by authorities to initiate change in the system's structure. They will fail to spark economic growth and development inside the Soviet Union. The question now becomes whether or not the West's perception of Gorbachev's aim to reform will encourage it to come to the aid of USSR. If the West comes to aid of the Soviet Union in time, it could save the system. It appears that Gorbachev is gambling on the West to solve his problems rather than reevaluating and restructuring the system himself. Vladimir Bukovsky states, "it is the West that must choose between the death of Communism in the 20th Century and its survival into the 21st" (65).

Are Communist regimes capable of reform? Before this question can be answered, another must first be raised. As Agnes Heller asks, "What makes a regime a communist system par excellence?" Heller places communist regimes under the category of "modern totalitarian systems." She goes one step

further to redefine this concept. She feels that the main characteristic of totalitarianism today is the banning but not abolishment of pluralism. No modern society can exist without pluralism; thus pluralism can never be totally abolished. Once the pressure on society has been slightly eased and the extinct pluralism has reemerged, the ruling parties will be faced with three options. One, they may perform a complete "about-face" from totalitarianism to detotalitarianism. Two, they may respond to pressure by not genuinely restructuring general totalitarian policies, but rather by increasing their tolerance of pluralism. Three, the ruling parties can opt to maximize pressure on society to force back the pluralist forces (Heller 22-3). The Soviet Union and other Eastern European countries are finding themselves faced with this decision. Time has not allowed us to see which of the three options these countries have chosen. Speculation, however, leads me to believe that Poland, Hungary, and East Germany have chosen the first option while the Soviet Union has chosen the second. Why would these countries choose option number one as opposed to number two? The Eastern European countries do not have the same commitment to Marxist-Leninism as does the Soviet Union. Furthermore, the Eastern-European countries do not have anything to lose if they do indeed decide to eliminate their communist system. The Soviet Union, however, does not enjoy this luxury. To eliminate the communist system would be to admit that their revolution was wrong. They would therefore lose all legitimacy.

The weaknesses of the Eastern European Socialist states add to their willingness to detotalitarianize. Mihailo Markovic claims that the basic weakness of existing socialist states is their identity crisis. These states pretend to be what, to a considerable extent, they are not. He also discusses the diversity among the states. These diversities break down into four categories. First, the Socialist model has been applied to countries with

different levels of social development such as East Germany and Albania. Second, cultural traditions in these countries are very different. Third, there was a genuine social revolution in Rumania and Yugoslavia unlike the situation in Poland and Hungary. Fourth, the Socialist model was not applied the same way in every country (16). The diversity and weaknesses found in Eastern Europe allow for these countries to break down the totalitarian regime and truly reform. While these communist regimes are capable of reform, they will not be able to do so and keep their communist status. As for the Soviet Union, their system does not allow them to truly reform even if they were to choose to.

Heller addresses the question of the possibility of reform in Soviet-type societies to a more non-communist system. Heller describes two scenarios, each providing little hope of reforms leading to a non-communist system. The first possible scenario is that no serious legitimacy crisis will emerge in these countries. The communist party will then be able to partially or completely detotalitarianize society while keeping totalitarian political power. The other possible scenario involves the rise of a legitimization crisis. In this case, the ruling party makes no attempt at saving the old "blueprints." Instead, the party would create a new system or recycle an old one. Once the identification with the new "blueprint" has taken place, there is a great chance that the reinstitution of a totalitarian society will take place. This would be a true reform of communism. In fact, this regime would cease to be communist altogether. It would however remain a single-party totalitarian system that continues to outlaw pluralism (Heller 24). Mr. Heller claims that his first scenario would lead to the weakening, or abolition, of totalitarian political rule while scenario number two would paralyze the ruling party to the point that it would abolish its total power.

Clearly, no communist regime can truly reform and at the same time, retain their communist status. Countries such as

Poland, Hungary, and East Germany may achieve true economic and social reform in the near future; however, they will lose their communist status as they reform. The Soviet Union will never be able to accomplish true reform because its system and its commitment to that system itself will not allow it.

Reform has little hope for success in the Soviet Union. First and foremost, it is difficult to expect reforms to succeed when none are being offered. *Glasnost* and *perestroika* are slogans Gorbachev has adopted to move a nation in hopes of sparking a new commitment to merely old or altered content. Gorbachev's rhetoric is not enough for the Soviet people. His messages appear to be enough for the rest of the world though. Sweeping changes must occur before the Soviet people trust Gorbachev or his campaign. Without the support of the people and a willingness to sacrifice for the accomplishment of economic reform, Gorbachev could not even begin to hope for success.

Another problem for Gorbachev is that the Soviet system will allow reforms to go only so far. The tremendous bureaucratic structure in the USSR will not allow for reorganization. Genuine reorganization would call for dissolving of structures and institutions, and the creation of new committees. Such proposals have not yet been made. Bureaucratic leaders realize that reorganization and restructuring will lead to lost jobs and power. They are clearly not willing to stand for either situation. Gorbachev therefore cannot afford to threaten his colleagues by introducing true reorganizational reforms.

Not only do the Soviet system and Soviet leaders stand in the way of true reforms, but the Soviet people are obstacles themselves. They have lost faith in their system. Gorbachev is not trusted and the intent of his reforms is questioned. The people fear high unemployment and high inflation as the price for Gorbachev's reforms. Needless to say, this is a price they are not willing to pay.

One final important consideration is the effect that *perestroika* will have on communism in the Soviet Union. The future of communism in the USSR rests entirely on the success of reforms. If Gorbachev's reform campaign fails to provide economic growth and development soon, the economic turmoil in the USSR will skyrocket to the point of collapse. If true reorganization were to take place, pluralism would begin to flourish to the point that it would eventually stamp out communism. Either way, communism dies and Gorbachev loses. Reforms are doomed to failure because of these two possible outcomes. Gorbachev hopes, however, that his charming personality and talk of sweeping reforms will convince Western investors to become a part of the new Soviet age in time to prevent either scenario from coming true. Gorbachev is taking many risks, but his circumstances demand this. To preserve communism, genuine reforms must not take place. Gorbachev is gambling that "restructuring" will be enough to relieve economic and political stress without allowing the pluralism that true reforms will inevitably establish.

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Ending Hunger: Obstacles and Opportunities

Leslie McFall

Widespread hunger and malnutrition have affected a major portion of the world's population for over fifty years. In developing countries alone, over sixty-five percent of the population receives less than fifteen percent of their essential caloric intake. It is hard for many Americans, confronted daily with a media encouraging them to eat less and emphasizing the effects of excess food production, to comprehend living in a society in which hunger is the norm (Delp 1986). The issue at hand is not famine, but chronic hunger, from which more than one billion people suffer each year. Some shocking statistics will place the urgency of this issue into perspective. Thirteen to eighteen million deaths result annually from hunger and starvation. Every forty-eight hours, as many people die of hunger and starvation as were killed by the atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima in 1945 (The Hunger Project 1985). Most people suffering from hunger and starvation live in Africa, in the equator region of Latin America, or in the region stretching from southeast Asia, through the Indian subcontinent and the Middle East. These areas are known collectively as the "Great Hunger Belt." Some of the nations included in this belt

are capitalist, and some are socialist. Most of them are poor, but some actually have very high per capita gross national products (GNPs) (Bonner 1985). Five countries alone, India, Bangladesh, Nigeria, Pakistan, and Indonesia, harbor fifty percent of the world's hungry people. According to the Hunger Project, as much as one-third of the world's hunger could be eliminated with the eradication of hunger in just one of these countries.

The Population Institute reports that 5.3 billion people currently populate the world. The number of people chronically hungry today parallels the total world population of 1830. By 1930, the world's population had doubled to two billion, and it doubled again in the period from 1960-1975. The Institute predicts that within the next 40 years, world population will have doubled to approximately 11 billion people. The majority of this dramatic increase will occur in underdeveloped countries, making it imperative that a ubiquitous effort be launched to attack the problem of hunger and to educate more people about this issue. In order to fully understand chronic hunger, one must consider the facts, pinpoint regions most affected, and define the causes surrounding hunger.

What causes hunger? An investigation of available material reveals five major contributing factors: population; food, including production and distribution; multilateral and bilateral aid; national security; and the New International Economic Order (NIEO). A thorough analysis of these five areas sheds light on the politics of hunger and provides possible solutions to this pressing problem.

By the year 2030 the world's population is projected to double its current level. Approximately ninety-two percent of this growth will occur in underdeveloped countries. For the last ten years, population has increased approximately two percent per year. About 0.7 percent of this growth has occurred in developed nations. Correspondingly, food production has risen

an average of 2.8 percent per year, an increase of about four percent per year in food production per person. However, in third world countries, population has grown by 2.4 percent per year, with a corresponding increase in food production of only 1.5 percent per year. Consequently, these countries are experiencing a decrease in food production per person (Bonner 1985). These statistics lend support to the belief that increases in population density and growth rate contribute to hunger and poverty.

High population growth rates are also associated with high infant mortality rates; as more babies are born, more will die (Population Institute). Countries with an average population growth rate of 2.7 percent possess an infant mortality rate of more than fifty per thousand live births. These high infant mortality rates are significant indicators of countries that face hunger as a basic issue in their society. In 1984, the three highest infant mortality rates were in Senegal, Burundi, and Iran with fourteen, twelve, and eleven percent respectively (World Development Report 1986). The Population Institute projects that, in 1990 alone, the world will see the deaths of 15 million infants within their first year of life. This comes to an average of 42,000 deaths per day.

The Population Institute also estimates that pregnancy complications will take the lives of 1500 women per day. Unwanted pregnancies, crude abortion techniques, and inappropriate intervals between pregnancies all contribute to this startling fact. Consequently, Western-supported groups such as the Population Institute have mobilized to provide birth control assistance to third world countries. Education, family planning, and aid are all essential in reducing infant mortality rates and in combating a growing world population.

Some believe that this population growth also limits economic development and may even threaten the survival of the human race. During previous population increases, food

production kept pace through such technological innovations as the Green Revolution. This event provided irrigation, herbicides and fertilizers, pesticides, and expensive modern day equipment to the Asian farmers; and these innovations brought a dramatic growth in crop yields that initially compensated for the high costs incurred. Soon after, however, the expense of extracting additional yields began to outweigh the benefits.

Nevertheless, evidence exists to support the opposing viewpoint, which holds that population growth, although important, is not at the root of the world hunger problem. Despite the increase in population more food is now available per person in the world than was available twenty-five years ago. Presently, enough food and other resources exist to meet the needs of the current and future world populations (The Hunger Project 1985). In fact, enough food is now produced to feed twice the world's population, and hunger has diminished in eighty-four countries, fifty of them since 1960. The problem remains, however, in the make up of this surplus. Not all the types of surplus foods available characterize the diets of indigenous populations.

The problem of local food shortages may result from deficient food production or inefficient food distribution. Also, many people cannot afford to purchase the food that is available. We know that enough food is currently produced to adequately feed the world's population, but some suggest that increased availability of modern technology in the third world is necessary to effectively curtail hunger. A more efficient use of agricultural resources is imperative in third world countries where the practice of marginal farming is not allowing nature the time to rejuvenate itself (Population Institute). The pressure for food supplies is exhausting the farmland, forcing farmers to trek to urban areas at a time when the growing population is already increasing the demand for food (Pirages 1989).

Clearly, access to technology would help these countries

to utilize their dwindling resources to their fullest potential. Unfortunately, most underdeveloped countries possess neither the purchasing power necessary to obtain this expensive technology nor the influence needed to manipulate the world market prices to their benefit. Thus, changes in the distribution of purchasing power or in the distribution of food could help to abate the prevalence of hunger (Pirages 1989).

Food security and storage pose additional problems for underdeveloped countries. The term "security" means that "adequate daily consumption of food [at all levels] is assured, even in years of bad harvest" (The Hunger Project 1985). Food storage is crucial in ensuring that food harvested seasonally will be available to curtail hunger year-round. Grain is the primary food stored to ensure food security. However, fluctuations in the production from major food-producing countries jeopardize this security. Bad harvests can cause price increases, and these increases victimize third world countries disproportionately.

Proposals have been made for a worldwide system of food storage, but none of them have been implemented. One proposal by United States Congressional Representative John LaFalce recommends that America take measures to help finance an international food reserve. He says that a United States contribution would help level the demand for domestic agricultural products and that the reserves could absorb a large amount of the food supplies when we enjoy bumper harvests. Many experts resist these proposals arguing that storage on local levels would be discouraged and that free enterprise would be affected adversely. However, it is evident that the problem of world hunger necessitates an eventual worldwide storage plan. If such a plan were implemented, the inevitable stabilization of prices would facilitate regulation of the world market. This reserve system would also benefit third world farmers by discouraging the "hoarding" of grain supplies by elites in these countries (Hunger Project 1985).

Even with an effective worldwide reserve system, however, disproportional distribution of food resulting from unequal income distribution in the third world countries could allow hunger on the local level to continue. In some of these countries, ninety percent of the population shares a mere fifty-eight percent of the gross national product. Systems of clientelism allow elites and their relatives and retainers to practice "skimming" off of the top of the income obtained from exportation of natural resources to developed countries (Bonner 1986). Hence, this income goes directly back into the pockets of the elites, affording the poorest percentage of the people in these nations a smaller piece of the pie.

The country of Mozambique serves as a prime example of food distribution problems faced by third world nations. Per capita income for this country is one of the lowest in the world. About 100,000 people in rural areas died as a result of the 1983-84 world drought. Government officials declared that more than half of the 1.1 million people living in the province of Inhambane faced severe food shortages, and despite approximately thirty aid programs in the country, food shortages remain a reality. In Mozambique, a country twice the size of California, food security is not so much a problem as distribution. Of the mere sixteen thousand miles of roads in Mozambique, only one-sixth are paved. Because of this poor infrastructure, delivering food often costs more than initially obtaining it (Norton 1987). Such cases as this demand immediate attention.

Food distribution also suffers when used as a weapon. Historically, control of food has been used to fight wars, to pressure other governments, or to make political points. For example, in 1985, the United States denied food shipments to Kenya until the Kenyan government would agree to leave distribution to the private sector. Despite pleas on the part of Kenyan officials, who tried to explain to the Reagan administra-

tion that no one outside the public sector knew enough about food distribution, the United States denied aid to Kenya on the basis of the American philosophy of private enterprise (Lappe 1987). The United States also embargoed Nicaraguan exports, primarily bananas, in the 1980's forcing that country to ship its products to Europe.

Experts have proposed several different solutions to the problem of local food shortages. Many recommend a renovation of the inefficient system of food distribution that now exists in certain nations. Others propose macro policies that would increase productivity in agricultural sectors to alleviate the problem. Opponents of government intervention feel that it does more harm than good and that a free market system is the best possible solution for a functional food system. However, a free market system cannot stabilize prices or reduce costs to countries that must import food. A regulated market would liberate funds normally spent on high food prices and allow reallocation of these funds for development (The Hunger Project 1985).

Another area that stands to be improved is that of land distribution. Technological aid and improvements will help little if land reform is not implemented first. Most of the farms in third world countries are small, and the limited percentage that are large generally produce less than the smaller farms. For example, in India, a Farm Management study of three thousand farms from six states found that size and productivity were inversely related. Thus, a redistribution of land from larger farms to smaller ones would likely increase output, employment, equity, and production (The Hunger Project 1985).

This leads to the third major issue surrounding hunger, that of foreign aid. Many questions surround the issue of foreign aid. Does foreign aid really work? Should food aid programs be maintained even though apathy and bureaucracy obstruct aid, even though food is often used as a weapon in

many third world countries? Some believe that foreign aid does work and contributes not only to the recipient nations, but also to the donor nations, and foreign aid has in some cases promoted stability, self-sufficiency, and development. But others feel that foreign aid programs have made little if any difference. They maintain that aid programs have actually impeded development and that they deprive the private sector of resources by handing them over to the governments.

Some analysts blame the unequal distribution of economic and political power for aid program ineffectiveness. They believe that such assistance as aid programs, technological improvements, and food storage and security reform is simply a "smoke screen" designed by the powerful to appease the masses and to retain their hold on economic and political power. These analysts invariably raise the point that reliance of the powerless upon the powerful inevitably perpetuates the world hunger problem. If underdeveloped countries could become self-reliant, many believe that social reforms adopted to achieve this goal would reduce much of the hunger in the world.

Critics of foreign aid argue that aid programs have not promoted "incentives and self-reliance," fundamental elements in any development program. These same critics believe that aid and development are mutually exclusive and that these programs often ignore important components of development such as motivation and entrepreneurial skills. By promoting only the interests of the donor countries, these aid programs deflate the recipient nations' ability and impetus to become self-reliant.

Indeed, the desire to protect self interests pervades foreign aid programs. The Economic Support Fund, a fund disbursed as grants rather than loans, exemplifies poor distribution of financial aid. One-third of the United States' bilateral aid dollars enter this fund, which purports to help the neediest countries but actually distributes aid to countries in which the

United States holds particular security interests. Approximately eighty-six percent of this fund is allocated for the Middle East, with Israel and Egypt, certainly not the neediest of nations, receiving the bulk of that money (Lappe, et. al 1980). Another aid program, the Marshall Plan, was implemented at the end of World War II and was designed to provide \$17 billion of relief over a four-year period. Its objective was three-fold: to provide humanitarian and political aid; to help block the spread of communism; and to help restore traditional markets for the United States. Thus, despite its philanthropic intentions, the Marshall Plan was, nevertheless, riddled with self interests.

The International Monetary Fund (IMF), on the other hand, takes an incentive approach to foreign aid aimed solely at making these dependent nations self-sufficient. In several third world countries, public policy emphasizes urban projects; thus, many governments must subsidize basic food stuffs. These subsidies stagnate agricultural prices at a level below what they could have brought on the open market and provide no agricultural incentives to farmers. Therefore, the IMF has taken steps to support programs in which the state marketing board pays higher prices to producers for what they produce. Freeing the market for agricultural products so that producer prices rise to "market-determined levels" and increasing subsidies on seeds, fertilizers, and other things provide two alternative incentive solutions (Johnson 1988). However, some contend that programs designed to furnish incentives expect too much from farmers who may not possess adequate managerial skills, motivation, or sensitivity to such agricultural conditions as marginal lands (Chibber 1988).

Other types of aid include bilateral and multilateral aid. Bilateral aid involves simply the exchange of certain commodities or services between two countries, while allowing the donor to exert the primary influence in the donor-recipient relationship. Multilateral aid, involving several donor countries,

constitutes about one-fourth of all Western economic assistance and includes the Development Assistance Committee (DAC), a committee comprised of seventeen nations bound in support of economic growth. Most of the DAC's members are Western nations, such as the U.S., the U.K., the Netherlands, West Germany, Italy, and Japan (Lewis 1983). Some critics see multilateral aid from the radical perspective, as an illusionary technique that only appears to benefit the third world. These critics feel that, in actuality, the Western nations exploit the defenseless third world countries and retain their holds on power by emphasizing their monetary contributions and voting power. The third world nations, on the other hand, feel that multilateral aid gives them the most discretion with regard to allocation of funds and that bilateral aid restricts their freedom. This difference of opinion leaves neither aid program with a promising outlook (Blake 1988).

Should aid programs continue to be promoted? It is doubtful that developed countries will cut aid assistance until such aid ceases to protect their self interests. Developed countries can be expected to use economic aid to clinch access to important natural resources found in less developed countries. Furthermore, developed countries protect export-related domestic jobs by providing aid and maintaining a favorable balance of trade (Blake 1988). Obviously, donor nations need to adopt a more humanitarian attitude and to realize that they can improve aid programs while attending to their own best interests.

However, recipient nations should not escape criticism. Bureaucracy tends to favor technological methodology and to implement programs inefficiently. Often times, the administration in underdeveloped countries falls short and policy formation and implementation is not efficient. Many overly ambitious third world countries find themselves concerned more with prestigious but unnecessary projects like super highways

or impressive soccer stadiums than with small scale self help programs like family planning. Thus, both sides can learn from past mistakes and improve in the future, and although economic assistance programs alone cannot solve the problem of chronic hunger, both donor and recipient nations stand to gain from amending aid implementation.

This brings up the issue of national security. Many favor a cut in national security spending to augment developmental spending and to reduce world hunger. Hence, one might argue that national security needs to be redefined. The military receives most of the money allotted for national security, and for those who favor a reallocation of money, the military is a major point of contention. Critics do not wish to diminish the importance of military support, but a comparative analysis between the costs involved in the upkeep of a strong military and the actual money spent on agricultural advancements reveals the impending need for a reallocation of funds. Funds spent on weaponry could be spent to build schools, to improve the country's infrastructure, and to purchase agricultural tools. By reducing military spending, a significant portion of funds could be freed and spent on development. The Brandt commission cites an example of the benefits of reallocation:

A modern tank costs about one million dollars; that amount could improve storage facilities for 100,000 tons of rice and thus save 4,000 tons or more annually: one person can live on just over a pound of rice per day. The same sum of money could provide 1,000 classrooms for 30,000 children. (Ceres 14)

Another point of contention is the relationship between national security and military forces. Security encompasses a wide range of things, not just a strong military. Security should

imply that a nation is capable of feeding all of its inhabitants and of providing a climate favorable for development. Those who favor a strong military and military assistance consider national security a vital priority for ensuring a stable environment. Upon closer inspection, military assistance appears especially important to Western nations concerned about the spread of communism. So who, in fact, is being protected? It would appear that the indigenous communities are being shielded from Communism, but in reality the only interests protected are those of Western democracies, such as the United States. Again, we see a need for a more humanitarian attitude among developed countries whose primary interest in this area, too, is to promote self interests.

Finally, many feel that a New International Economic Order is necessary to end hunger. The NIEO, composed of the aggregate demands of underdeveloped countries for economic reforms, could help to ensure a redistribution of resources from developed to underdeveloped countries. By providing better access to the IMF and to commercial loans with lower interest rates, the NIEO hopes to reduce the accountability of recipient nations. The NIEO also plans to increase the underdeveloped countries' percentage in world industrial output to twenty-five percent by the year 2000, to stabilize the international reserves and exchange rates, and to develop research and technological capacities in the third world countries (Cassen 1986).

Proponents of the NIEO claim that free markets are biased against the third world. These same advocates also believe that colonial powers are obligated to "redress the past wrongs done to their colonies," and that colonialism contributes to the amount of poverty in third world countries (The Hunger Project 1985). These arguments help justify the need for a redistribution of resources. Other supporters of the NIEO concede that it must have strong regulations to limit the influence of multinationals in the third world since drive for profits on the

part of these multinationals could actually create conditions favorable to poverty and chronic hunger. Transnational corporations, as explained by Murdoch's The Poverty of Nations, present an "obstacle to real development." Extensive corporate activity can result in a hoarding of natural resources, an improper use of land for raising profits but not for ending hunger, and an overall elitist attitude concerned with securing privileges.

Those who oppose a NIEO believe that the current system is working well and, if anything, needs to be strengthened. In support of this view, these opponents cite progress made by third world countries in the 1970's and claim that hunger in the third world countries has not resulted from a hoarding of resources. Nevertheless, following World War II, many third world countries lacked the infrastructure, foundations, political stability, or technical proficiency to effectively absorb such massive transfers of wealth over such a short period of time. Again, with opponents of the NIEO presenting economic justice as their primary objective, humanitarian aims lose priority in the aid programs.

Although the need for a New International Economic Order remains in question, whether effective or not, the NIEO alone cannot obliterate hunger from the face of the Earth. The problem of world hunger is a complex one and cannot be remedied with a single solution. China, Taiwan, and Sri Lanka have all experienced great success in reducing hunger, and each country approached the problem from a different angle. The Taiwanese focused on land reform. The Chinese sought help from the Communist Party, and Sri Lanka developed a democratic government committed to reform and decreased their infant mortality rates as a result.

What is the prognosis if no action is taken? Without improvement in the aforementioned areas, "the most probable outcome will be increasingly frequent but intermittent famine in

the poorest and most vulnerable parts of the world" (Bonner 1986). However, the world possesses the resources essential to reducing global hunger, and with a heightened awareness and established commitment from both developed and undeveloped countries, conquering hunger is a task the world can complete.

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Rabbit's Search for a Dalai Lama

Kate Sheehan

In the existentialist tradition, the need for a spiritual leader has been denied in favor of spiritual independence and freedom. For Harry Angstrom, John Updike's directionless Rabbit of Rabbit, Run, this modern tendency nearly goes unresolved. While Rabbit acts existentially, that is, upon the premise that as an isolated figure in a meaningless world, his actions do not affect others, Rabbit does not reveal a deep conviction in this way of life. Rather, Rabbit seems to desire the spiritual peace sought by the Lamaists with the aid of their spiritual leader, the Dalai Lama. Sensing the lack of purpose or meaningful pleasure in his life, Rabbit searches for someone to fulfill the directional role of the Dalai Lama in modern suburban America.

Amidst his suburb's concrete and aluminum, false demi-gods take on exaggerated importance in Rabbit's searching eyes. The first of the demi-gods to whom Rabbit looks for aid in fulfilling his spiritual quest is Jimmy, the big Mouseketeer. In the manner of a televangelist, he preaches to television viewers, "Know thyself" (Updike, John. Rabbit, Run. NY: Fawcett Crest, 1960. 14). This man wearing plastic mouse ears

plays the role of a modern Delphic oracle, and for this Rabbit "respects him" (14). Rabbit even tries to imitate him and concentrates on his words as they might be important to him "in his line of work" (14). As Rabbit and Janice, his wife, sit awestruck and humbled in front of the television screen bearing Jimmy's benevolent face, the pitiful lack of true spirituality and purpose in their lives is revealed.

This pitifulness reveals itself again in Rabbit's constant references to his former glories as a high school basketball star. The living memory of Rabbit's momentary greatness, his high school basketball coach Tothero, portrays a duality that is repeated in Rabbit of sagacity and foolishness. As perhaps Rabbit's first and greatest role model, Tothero gives Rabbit some good advice, although he himself is guilty of many of the same sins that plague Rabbit. Tothero advises him, "Nobody cares what you do," "Do what the heart commands. The heart is your only guide," "You can't make gold out of lead," and more (52, 53, 59). Yet Tothero sets up an adulterous relationship with Ruth, and even accompanies Rabbit on the immoral date. This impurity keeps Tothero from fulfilling the role of the Dalai Lama completely. Although Rabbit remembers him as the most forceful influence in his past, he also recognizes that Tothero is what most others consider him to be, a dirty bastard. This same duality of goodness and strength contrasting with moral imperfection repeats itself in Rabbit.

In addition to their moral similarities, the two share physical similarities as well. When Rabbit runs away from his wife, though at first uncomfortable and leery, he soon feels at home in Tothero's bed (49). Later that day, Rabbit discovers that he and Tothero wear exactly the same shirt size, even though Rabbit seems to be a larger man (50). Tothero explains this unknowingly in saying, "You and I are two of a kind" (50). Rabbit, like Tothero's son, resembles his mentor physically and morally, and, not surprisingly, turns to him for guidance and

support. Tothero explains his role as one "concerned with developing the three tools we are given in life: the head, the body, and the heart" (61). Thus he becomes responsible for all facets of his prodigy's existence and for directing his follower towards a wholeness which he names the "sacredness of achievement" (62).

When Rabbit first sees Tothero again after his attempted escape from Brewer, Tothero looks "stranger than Rabbit had expected...like a big tired dwarf" (44). Occasionally, Tothero's moral character betrays itself in his outward appearance which is often described in grotesque terms. Likewise, his eventual physical paralysis reflects his spiritual stiffness or inability to guide himself, let alone others, towards the discovery of an ultimate purpose in life. Lying in the hospital bed after his stroke, Tothero is nothing but an "old man lying there shrunken, his tongue sliding in his lopsided mouth...[his] face spotted...yellow" (197). Having seen Tothero stripped of the idealized projections stemming from Rabbit's memories, Rabbit can no longer face him and runs.

Updike consistently presents these ironic figures of insight and holiness while destroying more traditional holy figures. Reverend Eccles should personify the qualities of holiness and sagacity traditionally assigned to religious figures, but he consistently falls below these standards and into those of the entirely human realm. Although his imperfections allow him to be accepted by Rabbit, Eccles cannot be accepted as a Dalai Lama figure. While he is "friendly and silly," good-hearted and well meaning, Eccles is ultimately ineffective and secondary. Having immediately recognized that Eccles "doesn't seem to know his job," Rabbit relaxes his caution towards him somewhat and treats him as a companion, a pal (98). Furthermore, Rabbit's perceptions of Eccles' human characteristics which mark him as non-holy make Rabbit seem wiser even than Eccles, and thus without need of Eccles limited advice.

Eccles, too, realizes this, stating, "You're a better man than I am" (98). Despite his imperfections, though, he is determined to prove his sanctity and ability. Even after repeated set-backs and failures to reach Rabbit's conscience, Eccles feels he "will get on top of [Rabbit's] weakness, this flaw, and hence solve the problems" (157). Like Rabbit, Eccles searches for concrete solutions to abstract problems, and therein is destined to failure.

On the other hand, while physically simple and unattractive, the Lutheran minister Kruppenbach acts as the voice of spiritual truth in the novel and tries to explain Eccles' problem to him. He answers Eccles with an ostentatious but correct spiritual scolding explaining that a minister's job is not "to meddle in these people's lives" but rather to "make yourself an exemplar of faith" (158-159). This is what Rabbit searches for: a spiritual leader who offers himself as a model of goodness and wholeness, not someone who can spew off occasional proverbs or play a good game of golf. Furious with Eccles' typical businessman's approach to religion, Kruppenbach has offered him the solution to his and Rabbit's searching in calling for a practical example of spirituality.

As Eccles cannot provide this type of day-to-day spiritual leadership, Rabbit must find it in the figures who unexpectedly provide sound, knowledgeable advice: first, the big Mouseket-eer Jimmy, and second, the old gas station attendant Rabbit runs into on his random route away from Brewer and his responsibilities there. Although "patient...fatherly and crafty and stupid," the gas station man provides the most sound advice to Rabbit (30). While Rabbit seems unable to untangle the net of roads before him, let alone his life, the old man leads him towards a solution by asking him, "Where do you want to go?...Where are you headed?" (30). These "patient" and "fatherly" questions seem "crafty" or even "stupid" to a deaf Rabbit. Rabbit does not immediately recognize their signifi-

cance nor that of the proverbial, haunting statement, "The only way to get somewhere, you know, is to figure out where you're going before you go there," to which Rabbit replies, "I don't think so" (32). Without thinking, Rabbit denies truth in the man's advice. Although the man's words seem simple and perhaps obvious, their application is not. Because Rabbit does not know where he is going, he will never get there; and furthermore, Rabbit will not know where he is going until he finds someone to help him discover his way. Thus, in denying the man's words Rabbit binds himself to his perpetual, hopeless search for a wiser, more holy figure who could reveal to him his unknown destination.

This search immediately carries him through Amish country. Here Rabbit "tries to think of the good life these people lead, of the way they keep clear of all this phony business, this twentieth-century vitamin racket, but in his head they stay devils" (32). Apart from the society which constantly recalls Rabbit's failures and long-gone glories, these people live in communion with the earth and with God. Yet after passing an Amish buggy, the drivers "never appeared in his rear-view mirror. He passed them and there was nothing" (32). Although they represent an almost perfect spirituality, it is one in which Rabbit cannot take part because it is achieved through isolation and retreat. Because he must search for a spirituality within modern society, the Amish are "nothing" -- they are but ghosts appearing only to suggest the ideal and the impossible. Rabbit cannot choose their way, but must resolve a way of dealing with society while remaining a part of it.

Ironically, immediately afterwards Rabbit senses that perhaps he is not a part of society, that he is excluded from and unlike others. Standing outside of a roadside cafe, Rabbit feels excluded from the micro-society within and wonders, "Is it just these people I'm outside, or is it all America?" (36). Consistently egocentric, Rabbit seems convinced of his uniqueness

which is nothing but universal. Because he is isolated he does not know that he is like others. He continues in an existential pattern, unaware of others who do precisely the same thing.

Later, in the car, the gas station attendant's words replay through Rabbit's thoughts as he reminds himself, "The only way to get somewhere is to decide where you're going and go" (37). Yet the words' meaning continues to evade him, and he reminds himself to "figure out where you're going before you go there: it misses the whole point and yet there is always the chance that, little as it says, it says it" (39). Finally, Rabbit begins to see the simplistic solution to his net-like existence, but the realization does not produce action. Rabbit continues to search for someone else to lead him to his destination, unwilling or unable to accept that perhaps he himself could be that leader.

Updike consistently suggests that Rabbit himself has the possibility of becoming the Dalai Lama figure. At one point, Rabbit looks in the mirror and thinks "*He* is the Dalai Lama" (52). And yet he continues his search among others. His wife Janice also recognizes this possibility of holiness in asking, "What are you doing, becoming a saint?" (14). Although Rabbit acts immorally, he never reaches a depth from whence he does not desire to exit, does not wish to change, does not recognize his faults and feel guilty about them. But alone, Rabbit can do nothing but run from them, try to escape from the people around him who constantly reveal his faults and imperfections like great magic mirrors always in front of him.

This mirror which others hold up to him occasionally reveals goodness as well though. Eccles has provided Rabbit with the idea that he is a mystic because he gives people "faith" (135). Yet Ruth thinks he "just lived in his skin and didn't give a thought to the consequences of anything," while at the same time he has "the idea that he's Jesus Christ out to save the world just by doing whatever comes into his head" (139). Rabbit's existential behavior ironically makes him more holy in other's

eyes. While he seems to be living freely, his inner torments keep him tied to his guilt and confusion.

As if Rabbit offered Christ-like redemption, his former teammate, Harrison, remembers Rabbit for having made the other players "immortal" (164). Rabbit himself senses this as a "gap between [himself] and humanity," which may be more of a gap between others' perceptions of Rabbit and Rabbit's perceptions of Rabbit (187). Once the perceived notions of his power and holiness have been destroyed, Rabbit ironically feels powerful and holy. After his daughter's death, and having "stepped into nothingness" at his daughter's funeral, Rabbit considers founding "a new religion" (260). Ruth has told him, "You're not just nothing, you're worse than nothing" (279). Thus having virtually annihilated his own existence by ending his existence among others, Rabbit notices that "the outer world bears a decreasing relevance" (261). At this point, Rabbit's outward search for the Dalai Lama ceases, and an internal one begins. Rabbit wants to share this realization with Eccles, perhaps to fulfill Rabbit's own role as mystic and spiritual leader by informing Eccles that he "is on the way...I think there are several ways" (275), thereby relieving Eccles of responsibility for Rabbit's spiritual progress. Having realized that there may be "several ways" to reconciling with yourself, Rabbit may now figure out where he is going and begin his journey there. No longer must he wait for someone else to show him the one way, for his own way has begun to reveal itself to him.

While Rabbit's car radio announces to the fleeing Rabbit that the Dalai Lama is missing, Updike announces to his readers the lack of spiritual leadership or reconciliation in modern America. The only spiritual guidance in Rabbit's life is in the form of false demi-gods such as Jimmy the Mouseketeer or Tothero. But the guidance they provide is not sufficient to pull Rabbit from the net of conflicting lines in his life. At first, Rabbit feels that he cannot escape from the net on his own, and

thus he spends time unsure of his direction. Instead of realizing his own abilities to resolve his problems, Rabbit searches for comfort and guidance from the idealized figures around him. Yet as these figures never completely fit his mold of the ideal Dalai Lama, they fall from grace in his eyes. Sensing that they too are imperfect, Rabbit cannot accept them as his spiritual leader any more than he can accept himself in that role.

The traditional figures of religion, represented by the inanimate church across from Ruth's apartment only remind Rabbit of his imperfections without offering a solution to them. Although Rabbit carries the Christian burdens of guilt and responsibility, he cannot reconcile himself to their necessity even though he finds comfort in other traditional images of religion. In particular, Rabbit relishes the nice clothes of the Sunday churchgoers as "visual proof of the unseen world" (87). At this point in his spiritual development, Rabbit still appreciates the ideal, outward sign of sanctity. But at the same time, he senses what is to come, the "nothing ahead of him, Ruth's blue-eyed nothing, the nothing she told him she did, the nothing she believes in" (93). Once the traditional, imprisoning images of spirituality are removed, Rabbit experiences this nothingness only to find that it is not a nothingness devoid of everything, but one filled with everything. As the color white does not freely reveal the existence of all colors within itself, neither does the nothingness immediately reveal the existence of all possibility. When Rabbit finally realizes that his lack of spiritual leadership is due to his own over-idealistic expectations and his unwillingness to accept a practical, realistic spirituality, he "steps into nothingness" and becomes free to choose where he is going - free from his search for the Dalai Lama and free to fully become one for himself.

The Difference an Election Makes

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The dramatic changes which swept across Eastern Europe in late 1989 and early 1990 were a stunning testament to the possibility of dramatic and rapid social change. The West has welcomed the coming of democratic institutions to the East, and foremost among these institutional changes is the coming of free elections.

Americans seem to regard elections as tantamount to democracy and at the same time to equate elections with the solution of the problems of Eastern Europe. This is ironic because in the United States, elections have become the object of widespread derision. Popular accounts of election campaigns in this country have recently come to portray an electorate confronted with an indecipherable babble of symbols and deceptions bearing little if any significance for future actions by elected officials. If the election campaign does not serve to inform the choices the public makes, then how is the electorate to choose its leaders? If the electorate remains uninformed, or worse deceived, then in what sense do elections serve the aims of democratic government?

These are serious questions for democratic theory. But

they are also serious questions for empirical political science. The democratic theorist might well be concerned with issues of how informed an electorate must be in order to assure the responsiveness desired of a republican government. The empirical theorist, on the other hand, is concerned with the question of whether elections do in fact serve to inform the electorate or not.

In this article, I want to show that the empirical theorist can address issues which are also of concern to the normative theorist. In the process, I hope to demonstrate some of the strengths of empirical political science.

THE WAY ELECTIONS MATTER

There is no single measure of the importance of elections. Indeed, there are a great many different ways in which elections might matter, such as in selection of officials, structuring policy debates, mobilizing voters and so on. In order to empirically examine the impact of elections we must be careful to spell out exactly what aspect of elections we want to study.

In this article, I want to focus on the role of elections in informing the electorate. This is a fundamental aspect of elections because if elections leave the public ignorant or misled then whatever other effects flow from the elections can hardly be said to reflect the conscious intent of the public. On the other hand, if elections improve the clarity with which the public perceives political candidates, then there is reason to believe that the connection between citizen preferences and actions is more tightly drawn.

How might we study the role elections play in informing the electorate about the candidates? While there are many things about a candidate that voters might want to know, arguably the crucial piece of information is what is the candidate going to do if elected? That is, what are the candidate's policy

positions. If voters have a clear (and correct) notion of the candidates' positions, they can vote for the candidate most likely to match the voters policy wishes. The problem is how we can measure the perceptions of voters and assess how this matches the actual policy behavior of candidates.

For non-incumbent candidates, it is very difficult to measure the candidate's "true" issue position. However, incumbents do have a track record and that is the first key to this research. For members of the U.S. House and Senate, we have a record of roll call votes which reveal their actual choices on policy. Given this measure of actual behavior we can ask how variation in members' records affects citizens' perceptions of the members. Are Senators with very liberal voting records seen as more liberal by their constituents than are members with more moderate or conservative records?

Many interest groups rate Senators voting behavior by compiling lists of "key votes" and measuring the percentage of the time the Senator votes with or against the interest group's position. In the case of the American Conservative Union (ACU), the question is how liberal or conservative a Senator is. The ACU regularly publishes ratings of all Senators. This gives us a convenient measure of the conservatism of each Senator, as defined by those most concerned with the liberal-conservative conflict.

The crucial question is how does variation in ACU rating affect variation in perception of the Senator. In 1988, the National Election Study at the University of Michigan conducted a survey of voters in all 50 states. The survey focused on each state's Senators. Among the questions asked was a liberal-conservative placement question. The basic question is "We hear a lot of talk these days about liberals and conservatives. Think about a ruler for measuring political views that people might hold, from liberal to conservative. On this ruler, which goes from one to seven, a measurement of one means

very liberal political views, and a measurement of seven would be very conservative. Just like a regular ruler, it has points in between at 2, 3, 4, 5 or 6. Where would you place yourself on this ruler, remembering that 1 is very liberal and 7 is very conservative, or haven't you thought much about this?" Respondents are asked to place themselves, the incumbent Senators from their state, and the parties on this scale. This measure allows us to compare the perceptions citizens have of their Senators with the actual behavior of the Senators, as measured by the ACU rating.


If Senators actual behavior has any effect on perceptions we would expect those with high ACU ratings (very conservative voting records) to be perceived as conservative by the respondents in the NES survey. A way to represent this relationship statistically is through the linear equation

$$y = \alpha + \beta x$$

where y represents the respondent's perception of the Senator, measured on the 7 point liberal-conservative scale, x represents the Senator's ACU rating, and α and β are the intercept and the slope of the line. Figure 1 presents a hypothetical relationship between these variables in which $\alpha = 1.0$ and $\beta = 0.05$. The line crosses the y-axis at 1.0 (the intercept, or α) and the slope of the line is .05 (β). To find the predicted perception for a Moderate Senator with an ACU score of 50, substitute for x to get

$$\begin{aligned} y &= 1.0 + .05 \times 50 \\ &= 3.5 \end{aligned}$$

The value of representing the relationship in this way is that we can estimate the slope and intercept from the data. With this, we can say precisely how perceptions vary with roll call



voting records. The slope is the key piece of information because it tells us how sensitive perceptions are to changes in ACU rating. Higher slopes tell us that voters change their perceptions more for a one point change in ACU rating while lower slopes tell the opposite. This is crucial to one part of the research. We want to know if elections inform the public. One way that could happen is if elections lead voters to pay more attention to the records of their Senators. We can compare the slope for Senators who are running for reelection with the slope for Senators not up for reelection. If the slope is higher for those running than it is for those not running, then this is evidence that campaigns do serve to inform voters.

A second aspect of elections is whether campaigns make voters clearer about where the candidates stand on the issues. This is very hard to measure directly, but we can measure clarity indirectly in the following way. Think about voters rating a Senator on the 7-point liberal-conservative scale. For a Senator with a ACU rating of 80, not all voters will choose the same point on the scale. Some will see the Senator as moderately conservative and place her at 5 on the scale. Others will see the Senator as more conservative than that and pick 6. Still others may think she is at 4 on the 7-point scale. Another voter may see her at 7 and some may even place her at 3 or even 2. One way of measuring clarity is by how concentrated the perceptions are about a single point. At one extreme, everyone would place this Senator at 5, which would represent maximum clarity. At the other extreme, people would just rate the Senator randomly, with about equal numbers picking each point on the scale.

We can estimate this variability in perception. If perceptions are more concentrated about a single point, then we infer that clarity is greater while greater dispersion of perceptions implies less clarity. Again, our substantive interest is to know if campaigns increase clarity or reduce it. To answer this we want to compare perceptions of Senators running for reelection

with those of Senators not up for election. If campaigns clarify, then there should be less variability in perceptions among those running than among those not running.

The way to represent this step in our statistical model is to acknowledge that ACU rating does not completely explain variation in perception of Senators. That is, not every Senator with a 60 ACU score is perceived at exactly 4. Rather there are random variations in perceptions. We represent this by adding a term to the model above to get

$$y = \alpha + \beta x + \epsilon$$

where ϵ now represents all the influences on perceptions which are not captured by x , the ACU rating. Since ϵ includes everything other than x , we cannot say much about it. It includes things we don't even know about! But that is the beauty of the statistical model -- we don't have to know anything about what exactly is represented by ϵ in order to estimate the variation in these effects. Technically, we estimate the variance of ϵ , which is a measure of the dispersion of ϵ . For our purposes this is enough. If elections help clarify voter perceptions of Senate incumbents then the estimated variance for ϵ will be smaller for incumbents running for reelection than for those not up. This is the crucial piece of evidence we need for the argument about clarity.

These two hypotheses are the core questions I want to ask: do elections inform voters about the positions of the candidates and do elections make voters clearer about those positions? The statistical model provides aesthetic satisfaction in itself, but the substantive question must not be lost. We want to know if elections matter. The statistical model is a way of answering this question. Understand that there are many ways to answer the question. Philosophers would take a different approach. Ethicists would take another. Literature has, in countless ways,

tried to answer the same question. History has its own answers. The point is not that one answer is right and others are wrong or that one approach is best. The point is that empirical social science has its own way of approaching society and commenting about it. That commentary is grounded in dispassionate analysis of data, but the inferences drawn and the conclusions reached deal with questions of ultimate human concern.

THE FORMAL MODEL OF CAMPAIGN INFLUENCES

The model I actually estimate is a little more complicated. First, it is obvious that people don't form their impression of Senators based only on roll call voting. Most voters pay relatively little attention to politics and few know their Senator's roll call record in any detail. But there are other things that voters can use to judge where Senators stand on issues. The easiest and most readily available cue is the party of the Senator and where the party stands. Most voters do have perceptions of where the Democrats and the Republicans stand, and most know if the Senator is a Democrat or a Republican. Thus a simple and effective strategy of inference is for the voter to estimate the Senator's position from the position of her party. This simple mechanism is also remarkably informative. The average Democratic Senator in 1988 had an ACU rating of 16.5 while the average Republican had a score of 75.6, so guessing that a Republican Senator is conservative is not a bad guess!

A second influence on perception is the voter's own preference. It is well known that voters tend to "project" their own preferences onto the candidates. This produces a persistent bias in perception which makes the Senator look a little closer to the voter than she really is.

A third influence has to do with the clarity of perceptions. The campaign is not the only influence which affects clarity. The ability of the voter to process information is another

important influence. We would expect those who are more educated to perceive political positions more clearly than those with less education. This systematic effect is also included in the model.

Another influence on clarity is how closely the election is contested. Races which are close produce much higher amounts of news coverage as well as more advertising by the candidates. Other things equal, we would expect close campaigns to show greater clarity while easy contests would produce less information and hence less clarity.

Finally, the clarity of perceptions is probably influenced by the strategic choices of the campaigns themselves. Campaigns which focus their themes on only a few areas may produce a more coherent image of their candidate than campaigns which have a large number of themes. In order to capture this notion of campaign focus I have used the number of incumbent positive and negative campaign themes and the number of challenger negative themes. These variables are coded from journalistic accounts of the campaign found in Congressional Quarterly and similar political journals.

We want to include these elements in the campaign model so that the effects of the campaign will not be confounded with these other known influences.

THE STATISTICAL MODEL

This section can be skipped by those not interested in technical details. The model I estimate takes advantage of the Senate's multi-member district system of representation. This means that each citizen in a state with a Senate election also has a Senator *not* up for reelection. This allows us to capture campaign effects by comparing the perceptual model for those up for election with the model for those not running. This has the additional advantage that exactly the same set of respondents

perceive both a campaign environment and a non-campaign case. Thus there are no compositional differences between the campaign and non-campaign groups. The data are taken from the 1988 NES Senate Election Study. Respondents in states without a Senate election or without an incumbent seeking reelection are omitted from the analysis.

The dependent variable is the perceived incumbent's ideological position, as measured by a seven point liberal-conservative scale. This is assumed to be a linear function of the three elements discussed above: the incumbent's roll call record, the perceived party position, and the respondent's own preferred liberal-conservative position. The roll call record is measured by the Senator's 1988 ACU rating. The party position is the respondent's placement of the incumbent's party on the seven point liberal-conservative scale. The respondent's position is also measured on this seven point scale.

The stochastic component of the model is a function of the respondent's education (measured by years of schooling), the presence or absence of a campaign, the competitiveness of the campaign if there was one (measured by *Congressional Quarterly's* pre-election assessment), and the campaign themes used to measure focus.

The model, as described in the previous section, can be written as a regression equation in which the stochastic variance is a function of the education and campaign variables. Further, the coefficients in the location part of the model may be allowed to vary between campaign and non-campaign settings. The last technical complication is that the observations of running incumbents and those not running are not independent, because we have the same respondents reporting perceptions of both.

The model described above may be written as

$$y_1 = \alpha_1 + x_1\beta_1 + \epsilon_1$$

$$y_2 = \alpha_2 + x_2\beta_2 + \epsilon_2$$

where x_1 and x_2 are matrices containing the three influences on the perceived location of the Senators. Equation 1 refers to the incumbent seeking reelection while equation 2 describes the Senator whose term is not up. The subscript on β indicates that these coefficients can vary across the two Senators, reflecting the campaign effect. The effects on the stochastic component discussed above are captured by assuming that

$$\begin{aligned}\sigma_{\epsilon_1}^2 &= \exp(z_1\gamma_1) \\ \sigma_{\epsilon_2}^2 &= \exp(z_2\gamma_2)\end{aligned}$$

where z_1 is a matrix containing the education and campaign variables. Since campaign effects are assumed to only affect perceptions of the incumbent involved in the campaign, z_2 contains only education and an intercept, thus constraining the campaign effects to be zero for the Senator not up for reelection.

Under this specification y_1 and y_2 are jointly distributed. If we assume the stochastic terms have a bivariate normal distribution, then the likelihood for each observation is given by

$$\begin{aligned}L(\beta_1, \beta_2, \sigma_1^2, \sigma_2^2, \rho | y_1, y_2) = \\ \frac{1}{2\pi\sqrt{\sigma_1^2\sigma_2^2(1-\rho^2)}} \times \exp \left\{ -\frac{1}{2(1-\rho^2)} \left[\frac{(y_1 - x_1\beta_1)^2}{\sigma_1^2} \right. \right. \\ \left. \left. - 2\rho \frac{(y_1 - x_1\beta_1)}{\sigma_1} \frac{(y_2 - x_2\beta_2)}{\sigma_2} + \frac{(y_2 - x_2\beta_2)^2}{\sigma_2^2} \right] \right\}\end{aligned}$$

there ρ is the correlation between the dimensions of the bivariate distribution.

Taking logs and substituting the right hand sides of equations 3 and 4 for σ_1^2 and σ_2^2 gives the log-likelihood:

$$\begin{aligned}\ln L(\beta_1, \beta_2, \gamma_1, \gamma_2, \rho | y_1, y_2) = \\ -.5z_1\gamma_1 - .5z_2\gamma_2 - .5\ln(1-\rho^2) - \frac{1}{2(1-\rho^2)} \left[\frac{(y_1 - x_1\beta_1)^2}{\exp[z_1\gamma_1]} \right.\end{aligned}$$

$$-2\rho \frac{(y_1 - x_1\beta_1)(y_2 - x_2\beta_2)}{\exp[.5z_1\gamma_1] \exp[.5z_2\gamma_2]} + \frac{(y_2 - x_2\beta_2)^2}{\exp[z_2\gamma_2]}$$

Estimation of the parameters of the model is easily accomplished by maximizing this log-likelihood with respect to the parameters $\beta_1, \beta_2, \gamma_1, \gamma_2$, and ρ . (For more details on maximum likelihood methods see King, 1989). The estimation was carried out using Gauss-386 and the Gauss procedure Maxlik.

EMPIRICAL RESULTS

The estimates of the parameters of the model are given in Table 1. The table shows that the variables hypothesized to affect the perceived location of incumbents do have substantial effects. (Because the ACU scale is different from the seven point scales used to measure the other two variables, the coefficients should not be compared. The party location and self location variables are measured on the same metric, however, so comparison of these two coefficients is legitimate.) All parameters are much more than twice their standard errors, a standard for statistical significance.

The campaign effects on the location part of the model are seen in the differences in the coefficients between campaign and non-campaign contexts. In the table, the effect of party location has been constrained to be constant in both contexts because the unconstrained coefficients were virtually identical (.344 and .337 for campaign and non-campaign respectively). This constraint produces no change in the other coefficients of the model and so I have opted for the slight gain in efficiency bought by adding the constraint. The education coefficient in the stochastic component has also been constrained across contexts

Table 1: Incumbent Perception Model

	Election	No Election
<i>Location Parameters</i>		
Constant	2.101 (0.159)	2.298 (0.160)
ACU Score	0.008 (0.001)	0.006 (0.001)
Party Location	0.340 (0.023)	0.340† ...
Self Location	0.138 (0.028)	0.090 (0.030)
<i>Stochastic Component Parameters</i>		
Constant	0.596 (0.199)	0.921 (0.163)
R's Education	-0.024 (0.012)	-0.024† ...
Opponent Negative Themes	0.022 (0.032)	...
Incumbent Negative Themes	0.093 (0.030)	...
Incumbent Positive Themes	0.066 (0.026)	...
Competitiveness of Race	-0.346 (0.099)	...
ρ		0.293 (0.037)
Log-likelihood	-1682.0	
N	1086	

†Coefficient constrained to be constant in both equations.
Heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors are in parentheses

for the same reason.

The estimated coefficients show that during campaigns the weight given to actual policy behavior, measured by ACU scores, increases by about a third over the weight outside campaigns. The coefficient on self-location also increases during campaigns, from .090 to .138, or about 53%. These substantial percentage differences fall just short of conventional statistical significance: the differences in coefficients have probability $p < .10$. Nevertheless, the betting odds are rather good that the coefficients are larger in campaigns. It appears from this that campaigns do give voters more information about the policy records of the incumbents but it also appears that incumbents succeed in convincing voters that "I'm like you" when it comes to issues. Fenno's (1978) work on the lifestyles of House members suggests that this tie of representative to constituency is a frequent theme among members of congress. The increase in the self location parameter implies that incumbents are rather successful in getting voters to assume that their Senators are also like them.

The lower part of Table 1 gives the parameter estimates for the stochastic portion of the model. The negative coefficient on education indicates that as education rises, the variance of the disturbances decreases, as expected. The competitiveness of the campaign also plays a major role in the variance of perceptions, with competitive races being substantially less noisy than non-competitive ones. If, as I have assumed, competitiveness reflects the amount of information available in an election, then clearly voter's benefit from this increased flow of data.

The results also show that the extent to which the campaign focuses on a few or many themes plays a substantial role in the clarity of voter perceptions. The more themes the campaign involves, the less clearly voters perceive the location of the incumbent. There is a hint that negative campaign messages

from the incumbent produce more perceptual noise than do positive messages, the coefficient on negative themes being 41 % larger than the coefficient for positive themes. However, the standard errors of these coefficients are rather large, giving an estimated probability that the coefficients are different of only $p = .24$, so we cannot have great confidence that the difference is reliable.

It appears that the opponent's negative messages about the incumbent's issue locations have very little effect. The coefficient is less than its standard error, suggesting that voters discount messages about the incumbent's issue positions when these come from the opponent. This is not to say that negative campaigning has no effect. It may be that negative campaigns effectively alter voter affect for candidates. What the estimates here show is that there is little effect on the clarity of perception of incumbent issue positions, but this leaves open the possibility that negative campaigns influence other elements of candidate perception.

We can compare the intercepts in the stochastic component of the model to estimate the impact of having an election compared to not having one. The intercept for the election campaign is .596 versus .921 for the non-campaign. This difference is significant at $p < .01$. This indicates that the variance in perception of Senators not up for reelection is substantially greater than for those involved in a campaign, after taking account of the specific elements of the campaign included in the model. The estimated coefficients imply that the variance in perception of Senators not running is about 38% greater than for a comparable Senator who is campaigning.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

Substantively the message is that campaigns do influence voters. In some ways the influence is positive, from a

normative perspective, while in other ways the influence is less desirable. On the positive side, campaigns do help voters attend to the record of the incumbent Senator. The greater weight given to ACU score for incumbents facing reelection is evidence that the records of the candidates play a significant role in the election drama.

At the same time, I find that close contests promote clarity in perception, which is consistent with the belief that competitive pressures produce a greater flow of information to voters. Likewise, I find that once other factors are taken into account, the presence of a campaign substantially increases the clarity of perceptions among voters.

From these three results, it is apparent that elections can make a positive difference for voters' information about candidates. However, there is a less happy result in the data as well. For campaigns that choose to cover a great many themes, there is increasing confusion among voters. As the number of campaign themes increases the variance of the stochastic component of perceptions increases as well. In fact, these increases can wipe out the positive campaign benefits. What is more, as campaigns become more competitive, they tend to produce more themes. These two forces act to counteract one another, with competition increasing clarity while more themes act to reduce clarity. The upshot is that on average, competitive campaigns are not actually much clearer than are non-competitive races.

These average results should not mask the variability behind the average. There are a significant number of competitive races in which the focus is relatively high, producing relatively high clarity. At the same time, there are competitive races with very little focus, producing rampant confusion among voters.

The important point is that these effects of focus result not from something imbedded in the structure of campaigns, but

rather from the conscious choices of campaign strategists. Presumably campaigns become less focused when candidates and strategists think it in their interest to do so. Yet faced with the same electoral pressures, not all campaigns make the same choices. If candidates could be encouraged to focus their campaigns voters would be much better able to discern the candidate's positions. Proposals for electoral campaign reform should consider this aspect of campaigns in seeking to remedy some of the problems facing contemporary campaign practice.

And so, the answer to our question is that campaigns do make a difference. In part the effect of the campaign can be found in the information voters have in making their choices. The effects of the campaign are positive in some dimensions and negative in others. However, the major effect of campaigns are within the hands of strategists to control. That is the political effects of campaigns are in large degree subject to human control, rather than the pernicious whims of the gods. It is within our capacity to use campaigns to dissemble, but it is also within our capacity to use them to inform voters of their choices.

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